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1. GENERAL ASPECTS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 
1.1. Introduction 
Nuciear Power Plants (NPPs) utilize nuclear reactions to produce heat. The 
heat production is used to operate turbines and produce electricity using generators. 
The safe operation of NPPs has been underway for more than three decades 
worldwide. However, two major accidents have occurred in nuclear technology 
history: TMI and Chernobyl. These accidents have significantly impacted public 
acceptance of nuclear power and nuclear waste disposal sites. 
There are two basic criteria that must be followed in utilizing nuclear 
technology: safety and economy. These two criteria are applied sequentially. 
In addition to producing electricity, NPPs also produce wastes, namely 
radioactive waste. These wastes are categorized into three levels: Low Level 
Radioactive Waste (LLRW), Transuranic Waste (TRUW) and High Level 
Radioactive Waste (HLRW). 
LLRW is the radioactive waste that generates low decay heat, requires little 
or no shielding and contains very low levels of transuranic elements [1]. The 
sources of LLRW include contaminated clothing, plastics, laboratory glassware, etc. 
TRUW is the radioactive waste that contains isotopes above Uranium in the 
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periodic table. Tiiese wastes exiiibit low radioactivity but long half-lives and little 
decay heat. TRUW requires shielding but no cooling [2]. Both wastes are 
generated during reactor operation and maintenance of NPPs. 
HLRWs usually come from the nuclear spent fuel and liquid reprocessing 
wastes that are vitrified into solid wastes. Their initial activities exceed one 
thousand curies per liter and contain long-lived nuclides. 
Figure 1.1 shows general flow of radioactive waste generated from a NPP 
station. 
• SPENT FUEL 
Nuclear Power Plant CLOSE Reprocessing Plant 
Gas Solid Liquid Gas Liquid Solid 
OPEN 
Solidification * *• Solidification 
Dilution 
Release 
Solidification 
(Vitrification) 
Dilution 
Release 
Dilution 
Release 
Dilution 
Release 
Storage 
(10 - 20 Years) Temporary Storage 
Deep Buria Disposal Sea Disposal Land Disposal 
Figure 1.1. General Flow of Radioactive Wastes Generated from a NPP 
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In this figure, the fuel can either experience a closed or open fuel cycle. In a 
closed fuel cycle, the spent fuel is reprocessed and the liquid waste from the 
reprocessing plant is solidified prior to disposal as HLRW. In the open cycle, 
however, the spent fuel is not reprocessed. This fuel is usually stored in an interim 
storage facility for approximately 10 to 20 years to permit cooling before ultimate 
disposal. Note, that the open cycle is shown in boldface-type. 
1.2. Management of High Level Radioactive Waste 
As previously mentioned, HLRW is the spent fuel itself and vitrified liquids 
from reprocessing plants. In this study, reprocessing wastes will not be described 
further. Therefore, the discussion will be limited to an open fuel cycle or once-
through cycle. Also, defense high-level waste is not considered here. 
HLRW management includes the handling of spent fuel after discharge from 
the nuclear reactor and thus includes storage and disposal. One approach to 
HLRW management is to cool the spent fuel for approximately 10-20 years by 
placing it in an interim storage facility. This cooling time permits significant 
radioactive decay and reduces total activity and heat output. Thereafter, placing 
spent fuel in stable, deep geological formations with a number of containment 
barriers can safely isolate it from the environment. 
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Interim storage technologies have been developed for more than 40 years. 
Two techniques, which have received widespread interest, are water-filled pools and 
dry storage [2]. Spent fuel storage facilities are usually located at the reactor site. 
Some countries use a centralized storage site away from the reactor. Figure 1.2 
shows the interim storage methods that have been widely used around the world. 
In wet storage technologies, the spent fuel is immersed in pools of water, 
where radioactive decay heat is dissipated. Consequently, it is possible that 
corrosion of the spent fuel could occur. On the other hand, dry storage is 
essentially maintenance-free since natural convection heat transfer takes place and 
little corrosion will occur. 
The repository is the place where the encapsulated spent fuel is placed for 
final disposal in a selected geological medium. The disposal site can be either 
above (unsaturated zone) or below the groundwater table (saturated zone). 
The encapsulation of the fuel canister employs either single or multiple 
barriers. Fuel elements are designed to retain fission products and to have very low 
corrosion rates. 
The repository facility is designed to ensure that if toxic radionuclides are 
released by the spent fuel, they remain isolated from the accessible environment 
(AE). This isolation should continue until at least the radionuclides have decayed to 
levels that will present no unacceptable risks to future generations. 
5 
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Figure 1.2. Interim Storage Metliod Elements 
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The main components of the repository barriers are the near-field, the 
geosphere and the biosphere. The stable waste fonri and corrosion-resistant 
package combined with engineered barriers are the near-field components. The 
geosphere is the geological media itself, where the ability to restrict groundwater 
flow, hence low permeability, is considered an ideal geological attribute. The 
biosphere can serve to dilute radioactivity and, although in a strict sense, may not 
constitute an isolation barrier. 
1.3. Concepts and Criteria for Ultimate Repository Seiection 
Prior to ultimate disposal of HLRW, it should be stored for some time. This is 
due to its potential radiological hazard, which declines with time. The fission 
products retained in the spent fuel undergo natural radioactive decay. To measure 
the relative hazard of this waste when compared to other wastes, one method is to 
compare its hazard potential to the hazard presented by an equal volume of 
uranium ore [3]. The ratio of these two hazards can be considered as a relative 
hazard index. Figure 1.3 shows the relative hazard index versus storage years. 
This figure shows that in the first year of storage, the f-ILRW is about 1000 times as 
hazardous as the natural uranium ore, but after 10,000 years in storage the hazard 
is significantly less, decreasing by about two orders of magnitude. 
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Figure 1.3. Hazard of HLRW versus Storage Time [1] 
Several parameters must be addressed to evaluate the isolation of HLRW in 
a deep geological medium. These parameters include groundwater flow rate, 
sorption of radionuclides in the geologic medium, dispersion action, and dilution of 
radionuclides by surface water. Therefore, minimal permeability, maximal flow 
dispersion, minimal chance of forming apertures, and minimal thermal disturbance 
will make up ideal characteristics of a geologic medium [1]. Furthermore, an 
understanding of the exposure pathways is also very important for prediction of the 
eventual fate of any radionuclides. 
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Several countries such as France, Canada, Germany, Belgium, and Japan 
primarily consider salt, granite, and clay as the geologic media for the HLRW 
disposal facilities [3]. In the United States, however, the Yucca Mountain site 
(located in the state of Nevada), which has tuff geological formations, has been 
selected for site characterization [4]. 
1.4. Universal Container System (UC System) 
In addition to identifying the Ideal criteria for a geologic medium, along with 
understanding the pathways and release mechanisms of radionuclides, the 
containment system that isolates the spent fuel itself must be carefully selected. 
The containment materials should be well-chosen such that the disposal container 
can be safely emplaced in the geologic medium. The containment design must also 
be economically sound. 
The conventional approach for containment management is usually divided 
into several steps. The first step is loading spent fuel in an interim storage 
container. Second, unloading the spent fuel from that container, and placing the 
fuel into transportation casks. The casks are transported from a reactor site to a 
centralized interim storage facility. Finally, another container must be prepared for 
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ultimate disposal. These handling steps and procedures are cumbersome and 
should be reduced to avoid unnecessary radiation exposure. 
One of the most promising containment schemes is known as the Universal 
Container System (UC System). The UC system is an integrated system in which 
spent fuel assemblies would be loaded and sealed in multi-assembly containers at a 
receiving facility [5]. The spent fuel would be stored, transported, and finally placed 
in the ultimate repository without ever reopening. The advantages of this system is 
that the number of required handling steps and procedures are significantly 
reduced. Two classes of UC system includes Multi-Purpose Containment (MPC) 
and Multi-Element Sealed Canisters (MESC). 
MPC is a sealed multi-assembly container. It is a thick-walled, fully shielded 
container and is capable of handling 6 to 10 MTU of spent fuel. This container is 
the prime candidate for achieving direct disposal of the spent fuel without ever going 
into reprocessing in the future. On the other hand, MESC is a sealed, multi-
assembly container with thin-walled storage baskets containing 6 to 10 metric tons 
of spent fuel [5]. MESC may be used as low cost interim storage and shielding just 
before final disposal. If spent fuel reprocessing is considered as a future option, 
MESC can be considered as the choice for container selection due to its greater 
flexibility. 
There is another container design concept in the UC system that may provide 
a more robust waste package. This extra robustness increases the certainty of 
meeting containment requirements, provides tolerance to a wide range of repository 
conditions, employes multi-barriers, and uses a defense-in-depth approach and lend 
itself to drift emplacements [6]. This design is also referred to as a hybrid design of 
the UC system. The robust waste package increases the breaching time beyond 
that of the non-robust waste pacl<age. 
The materials selected for a container design must be tolerant of the geologic 
conditions. The container will be placed in the deep geologic repository for a long 
time, over 10,000 years. A wet geologic medium requires the use of container 
materials that are different from a dry environment. In the Yucca Mountain site, for 
example, the inner containment material will be one of the following candidate 
alloys: Alloy 825, Alloy C-4 or Titanium Grade 12 [6]. Outer containment materials 
can be either corrosion-allowance or corrosion-resistant materials, based on data 
identified in degradation mode surveys for the specific environment of interest. 
1.5. Objective of the Research 
This thesis will discuss the research required to complete a total system 
performance assessment (TSPA) analyses of the proposed disposal site for HLRW 
in Indonesia. Up to now, the final site has not yet been officially determined by the 
government of Indonesia. However, since Indonesia has constantly been pursuing 
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an interest in building NPP stations to produce electricity, radioactive waste will 
become an important issue in the future. This research effort will serve as a 
scientific reference for future investigations. 
The research will include an estimation of the amount of HLRW that will be 
generated when the first NPP begins in operation in the year 2004. The HLRW 
inventory will be estimated by extrapolation for 25 years thereafter. A 
recommendation of the number of containers required can then be presented. 
Since the Indonesian archipelago lies along the equator, the climates are 
very different from those in subtropical areas. The rate of rainfall is significantly 
higher than in subtropical areas. The temperature ranges from 20^0 to 350C 
throughout the year. Therefore, the type of materials for waste package 
containment must be carefully examined. 
The ease of transportation and other accommodations in developing 
countries is usually less efficient compared to developed countries. Especially in 
Indonesia, which consists of 13,677 islands, management of the transportation 
system becomes even more difficult. Therefore, the site proposed should be 
carefully chosen such that it will not further complicate the transportation system. 
One of the most important considerations is modeling some scenarios of 
disruptive events that might occur at the repository site. This Is very important to 
understand the possibility of radionuclide releases from the repository facility to the 
AE. Therefore, caution may be taken to anticipate such possibilities, in this 
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research, the potential repository facility Is assumed located in the saturated zone 
(below the groundwater table). Integrating repository scenarios will be completed 
by modeling the proposed site with a computer code called Repository Integration 
Program (RIP), developed by Golder Associates, Inc. [7]. The results of the RIP 
model will be analyzed. Integrating the analyses with the other relevant information 
will serve as the basis for the TSPA of the proposed facility. The analyses of the 
results from the RIP computer code will be mainly on the impacts of the releases of 
the radionuclides within the exclusion xone limit used in this study. 
In terms of dose/risk evaluation, the radiation doses of several radionuclides 
that have long half-lives and a range of retardation factors will also be calculated. 
The dose calculations use the assumptions that a individual lives on the vicinity of 
the AE and ingests these radionuclides through drinking water. The drinking water 
source is the groundwater. The seawater will not be used as the source of the 
drinking water. This will entail the impact to human when he or she lives within the 
area of repository facility. 
In addition to the above, critical data necessary to reduce the uncertainty in 
site performance predictions will also be identified and may be useful for future 
investigations. 
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1.6. Overview of Thesis 
This chapter has been a survey of the general aspects of radioactive wastes. 
Some definitions that have immediate relevance have also been given. More 
detailed discussions will be presented in the following chapters. 
Chapter 2 discusses the results of a feasibility study that was conducted in 
Indonesia to determine the likelihood of having NPP programs in the country. It 
discusses the regulatory body dealing with nuclear and radiation activities in the 
country. 
Chapter 3 serves as the literature review. This chapter presents the relevant 
research that has been conducted elsewhere. 
Chapter 4 discusses the methodology used to conduct for the total system 
performance assessment of the Genting Island repository site facility. 
Chapter 5 is the core of discussion of the repository integration modeling. 
The analysis of the results from the RIP code are presented. Furthermore, the 
radiation doses that might be received by a person lives in the area are also 
presented. 
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the results and provides suggestions for some 
activities that can be pursued in the future to make the research in this area even 
more applicable to the regulatory requirements. 
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2. PROJECTION AND PLANNING FOR BUILDING THE NUCLEAR 
POWER PLANT PROGRAM IN INDONESIA 
2.1. Forecasting Electricity Demands 
Indonesia is currently one of the member nations of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). It exports crude oil and condensate 
products to countries such as Japan, USA, South Korea and others. However, due 
to rising domestic oil consumption, the export of crude oil has declined. To 
maximize domestic oil refinery output in meeting specific product needs, Indonesia 
has become a crude oil and refined product importer over the past several years. In 
1990, for example, Indonesia imported 45.7 million barrels of crude oil and 24.2 
million barrels of refined products [8]. 
According to the Ministry of Mining and Energy of the Indonesian 
Government, Indonesia's energy generating capacity primarily includes Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas (LPG), natural gas, geothermal, hydropower, coal, and uranium 
resources. Oil reserves have been estimated to be of 5.3 billion barrels. The 
maximum production capacity is 467 million barrels per year. The LPG and natural 
gas reserves are estimated at around 216.8 trillion standard cubic feet (tscf). The 
total proven and probable coal reserves are about 4.8 and 18.8 billion tons. 
respectively. The geothermal potential reserve is approximately 10,825 MW. The 
largest shares of geothermal reserves are within the Java-Bali Islands. The 
potential of hydropower is of approximately 75 GW in which only 3.2 GW has been 
used for electricity generation. It is unfortunate that the hydropower resources are 
located in thinly populated areas such as the Kalimantan and Irian Jaya Islands. 
Uranium resources exploration is still at an early stage. However, 10,380 tons of 
Uranium have been found in West Kalimantan [9]. 
The State Electricity Generation Company (Perusahaan Listrik Negara -
PLN) of Indonesia is the government owned that produces electricity. Its primary 
function is to generate and distribute electricity in the country. According to PLN, 
the growth rate of energy used to generate electricity has been of about 18.1% 
annually from 1970 to 1990 [10]. 
In the feasibility study report of the first NPP in Indonesia, the energy and 
electricity demands have been forecast [11]. The electricity demand was estimated 
based on macroeconomic growth rates. The electricity demand includes generation 
of electricity from PLN and private companies (non-PLN), as shown in Table 2.1. 
This table shows that by the beginning of the next century the country will need an 
additional electricity generation of 88,926.94 GWh. This is more than a 66% 
increase of the current demand. Therefore, the government needs to determine 
well-planned electricity supplies to meet the projected demand. Until present time, 
PLN regulates the electricity tariff in the country. 
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Table 2.1. Projected Electricity Demand from 1990 - 2019 (In Gwh) [11] 
Demand Sector Actual Projection 
1980 1990 2000 2010 2019 
Households 2,910 9,004 27,880 83,066 195,340 
Manufacture 14,706 39,285 94,955 214,618 408,555 
Services 1,800 5,093 19,473 59,552 126,264 
Total 19,415 53,382 142,309 357,236 730,158 
Combining alt potentially energy sources available, the study concluded that 
Indonesia will need to use nuclear energy to meet the projected demand. It is 
estimated that nuclear energy will play a role by the year 2004. Figure 2.1 shows 
the estimated role of nuclear energy in meeting the demand for electricity [11]. This 
figure provides the expected energy utilization by fuel type in barrels of oil 
equivalent (boe) for Indonesia for the time period from 1990 to 2018. The utilization 
of NPPs in Indonesia will be based upon the ability of these units to produce 
electricity at reasonable rates. The cost of electricity production from NPPs should 
compete fairly with other energy sources. 
While building costs of conventional nuclear power plants such as light water 
and CANDU reactors can be calculated using well-established models, the costs of 
17 
building of the advanced type of reactors, though less predictable, are projected to 
be lower. However, the advanced reactor types are still in the licensing stages. 
Therefore, caution must be taken due to the greater uncertainties involved. Capital 
cost and fuel cycle cost are the most significant part of generation cost. The 
advanced reactor types promise the possibility of building one with modular 
approach. They should be examined carefully. 
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Figure 2.1. PLN Electricity Supply Plan [11] 
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2.2. The First Nuclear Power Plant Programs 
The need for large electricity generation by the beginning of the next century 
encourages Indonesia to consider building NPP stations. Nuclear energy has 
several advantages compared to other generating power plants. 
First, it uses a relatively small area of land. This fact is primarily attractive to 
Indonesia, since the plant v/ill be built in Java Island. Sixty percent of the 
Indonesian population lives on Java. This is because Java is the most developed 
Island. 
Second, from an economic point of view, the feasibility study shows that the 
generation cost of a 600 MW(e) NPP is lower than that of similar sizes of coal-fired 
power plant [11]. It also shows that the generation cost of the NPP is still 
competitive with the combined-cycle plant with similar power. 
Third, the uranium fuel market price is currently very low. Therefore, 
Indonesia can take advantage of purchasing uranium fuels from overseas in the 
near future. Although the technology to explore uranium resources in the country 
must continue to be developed as well. The ability to self-sustain fuel stocks for 
domestic needs must be considered to compensate for the possibility of rising 
uranium fuel price overseas in the future. 
The development of the Indonesian NPP program dates back to October 1, 
1973, when a seminar discussing the possibility for using NPP for electricity 
19 
generation was first held [12]. From that point there have been a number of 
seminars, symposiums and woricshops held to promote the use of nuclear energy. 
The feasibility study also discusses the safety aspects of each reactor 
candidate and the economics for building each of the light-water type reactors. The 
study offers a comparison of a number of safety related instruments from a variety 
reactor types. It is very likely that the first NPP will be a pressurized water reactor 
(PWR) type using a 600 MW(e) design. PWR is a proven technology and has been 
in operation safely for decades around the world. Besides PWRs, the other types of 
reactor being considered are the advanced types, namely AP600 and SBWR. 
According to the plan, 10 NPP stations are planned to be built in Muria 
Peninsula on Java Island over a 25 year period starting in 2004 [13]. The peninsula 
is located at the northern side of Central-Java province. 
2.2.A. The Fuel Description of the Nuclear Power Plant 
The detailed description of the first NPP in Indonesia has not yet been made 
available for public review. However, there is a strong Indication that the 600 MW(e) 
PWR will be selected as the first NPP [13]. Therefore, throughout this report the 
standard PWR parameters will be used when necessary. 
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The description of the PWR that is relevant to this report encompasses the 
overall fuel assembly characteristics. The generic data is taken from the 
characteristic database of Light Water Reactor (LWR) supplied by the US 
Department of Energy (DOE) [14]. Regarding the HLRW, the pertinent information 
relates to the nuclear fuel assembly. The overall assembly characteristics are 
provided in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. The Overall Assembly Characteristics [14] 
Assembly Class Westinghouse 15X15 
Assembly width (inches) 8.43 
Assembly length (Inches) 159.71 
Rod pitch (inches) 0.56 
Average weight of Uranium (Discharge fuel) 453.90 
Enrichment range (% 235) 1.86 - 3.99 
Average discharge bumup (MWd/MTIHM) 29,456 
Maximum discharge bumup(MWd/MTIHM) - - 44,720 
This description is for a Westinghouse standard fuel assembly (15 X15). 
There are 225 fuel rod positions in the assembly. Each of the fuel assemblies 
consists of 204 fuel rods. The remaining positions are used for bumable poisons 
and control rods. The fuel rod description can be seen in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3. Fuel Rod Description [14] 
Fuel rod positions per assembly 225 
Number of fuel rods per assembly 204 
Rod diameter (Inches) 0.422 
Rod length (inches) 148.59-151.88 
Active fuel length (inches) 142.00 -144.00 
Weight per rod (lbs) 6.77-8.85 
Clad material Zircolay-4 
Clad thickness (inches) 0.0242 
Fuel-dad gap (inches) 0.0038 
Fill gas used He 
Initial gas pressure (psig) 0-475 
Nitrogen content of fill gas (percentage) 4-78 
Fuel pellet material Uranium Oxide 
Fuel pellet shape dished, chamfered 
Fuel pellet diameter (inches) 0.365-0.366 
Fuel pellet length (Inches) 5.52 
Fuel pellet weight per rod (lbs) 0-3 
Grain size (microns) 8-20 
Fuel density (% theoretical) 95 
Smear density (gr/cm®) 10.07 
Plenum spring material St Steel 302 
Plenum spring weight per assembly (Ibs)  ^ 0.038 - 0.044 
Plenum length (inches) 8.20 
Plenum volume (cubic inches) 1.25 
2.2.2. Physical Description of the First Nuciear Power Plant Site 
The design and construction of a NPP must ensure that the occurrence of 
natural phenomena will not cause the reactor containment structure to collapse and 
a loss of safety function to occur. The natural phenomena include effects of 
earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods. Therefore, seismology, 
meteorology, hydrology and geology of the plant site must be investigated in great 
detail. 
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Geologists believe that the surface of the earth is composed of large 
structures called tectonic plates [15]. An earthquake takes place as the result of the 
movement of these tectonic plates relatives to one another. Because of high stress 
energy along the edges of the plates or faults, these plates can undergo sudden 
movement resulting in an earthquake. 
Meteorology is important in a sense of the dispersion of effluents from a 
power plant. A NPP must be designed and constructed to withstand large storms. 
The design must not only withstand direct wind force, but also impact of the objects 
that have been picked up by the winds. 
Investigation of the site hydrology is necessary to prevent large quantities of 
water from entering the site. If the site is located on the seashore, as in the case of 
NPP in Muria peninsula, an investigation to estimate the largest tidal wave possible 
must be conducted. Watertight structures must be designed to withstand the 
maximum expected water intrusion. 
Geological structure of the site must be investigated to determine whether the 
area can adequately support the reactor building. In the Muria peninsula, there are 
two volcanoes composed of alkali-potassic and ultra-potassic rocks that were active 
in the late Tertiary to Quartenary ages [11]. The volcanoes are located at a 
distance of about 100 km north the volcanic axis of Sunda Arc. 
The proposed site of the first NPP is in Ujung Watu. It is located on seashore 
of the Java sea on Muria Peninsula. Around the Ujung Watu site, lapllli-tuff of Ujung 
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Watu formation is widely distributed. It is composed of calcareous sandstone, 
claystone, and limestone rich in fossils. 
Other available data about Ujung Watu include the moisture content of the 
soil (54.5 - 58.4%), the rate of rainfall (2,992 mm/yr.), and the groundwater flowrate 
(0.15 cm/day) [16]. 
2.3. Projection on High Level Radioactive Waste iVIanagement 
In parallel to the plans for building NPPs in Indonesia, the projection of 
HLRW that will be generated should also be considered. This consideration is very 
important since HLRW will pose significant challenges when it accumulates as the 
reactors are operated to produce electricity. HLRW mainly consists of the spent fuel 
itself. 
Eventhough the generation of HLRW will not be in significant quantities for at 
least 10 to 20 years after the beginning of plant operations, the technology and 
management of these wastes should be evaluated and implemented as soon as 
construction of the NPP begins. Development of HLRW management techniques 
will also show the Indonesian people that the scientists, engineers and utility 
managers responsible for safe operation of these facilities are aware of the 
24 
ramifications of nuclear power. This, hopefully, will increase public acceptance by 
the people of Indonesia and the world. 
The technological solutions for HLRW generally accepted around the world 
include a moderate cooling period (approximately 10 to 20 years) to decrease 
radioactivity. Aftenn/ards, the management effort is focused on development of 
ways to safely isolate the HLRW from the AE. This is done by placing HLRW in 
stable, deep geological formations with a number of containment barriers. 
Table 2.4 shows the estimated amount of spent fuel generated from lO^GWh 
output of LWR and PHWR, which is based on the calculation with capacity factor of 
80% [17]. From the table, we can see that for a 10,000 GWh output from a PWR, 
3.1 MTU of spent fuel will be generated. Using a CANDU 3 as the reactor, however, 
the spent fuel generated will be 23.7 MTU. 
The principal activities in the final disposal stages consist of encapsulation of 
the spent fuel and underground disposal. The spent fuel is required to be packed in 
a specially designed container and then emplaced in either the unsaturated zone 
(above the groundwater table) or the saturated zone (below the groundwater table). 
The investigation of the proposed HLRW disposal site facility from a 
geological stand point has been conducted in Indonesia. One of the promising 
option of this investigation is to dispose the HLRW in an Island in close proximity to 
the Ujung Watu site (northern side of the Central Java island), and this means it is 
convenience in transportation. The proposed repository site facility is on the 
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southern side of Genting island, located in Karimunjawa archipelago [18]. The 
archipelago is administered by Central Java province. The Genting Island is the 
most eastern part of the Karimunjawa archipelago. It takes approximately 2 hours 
by motorboat to reach Genting Island from the main archipelago [18]. 
Table 2.4. Spent Fuel Generated from Various Types of Nuclear Power Plant [17] 
Type/Vendor 600 MWe 900-1000 MWe Advanced Type 
PWR PHWR PWR BWR PHWR AP600 SBWR CANDU3 
WH NPI AECL WH NPI NPI GE AECL WH GE AECL 
Elect. Output (1) 615 645 638 866. 1060 994 952 881 631 635 432 
MWe 
Fuel Cycle Length (2) 10.6 11.6 12 11 11.6 11 17.3 12 15.3 22.2 12 
EFPH 
Ave. DIs. Bumup (3) 41.1 45.3 7.3 42.2 45.2 47.7 38.4 6.5 40.7 38.2 6.5 
GWD/HTU 
Generated SF fori 14.8 14.8 112 20.3 24.0 20.3 39.7 174 22.1 35.4 89.5 
Fuel Cyde (4) 
Generated SF for 13.4 12.2 89.6 7.7 19.9 17.7 22.0 139.2 13.9 15.3 71.6 
Ave. 1 Year 
Operation 
Generated SF for 3.1 2.7 20.0 2.9 2.7 2.5 3.3 22.6 3.1 3.4 23.7 
1000 Gwh 
Generation 
(1), (2), (3), (4) = Source "Fuel Cycle Evaluation" (INPB-D-002) 
(5) = (4)/{(2)/12 X 170.8} (80% capacity factor) 
(6) = (4)/{(1) X (2)/12 X 8760 /1000} 
EFPM = Effective Full Power Month 
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The main reasons for considering the southern side of Genting Island as the 
proposed location of HLRW disposal site facility are: 
1. The area is remote 
2. Very low in population density 
3. High strength basaltic rock formation 
4. The economic growth potential of the island is very small 
5. Close proximity to the proposed NPP site 
The Genting Island is about 2.6 km long and 800 m wide. The total area is 
approximately 135 Ha (333.6 acres). The southern tip of the Genting Island covers 
an area of approximately 30 Ha (74.1 acres). The elevation of this area is between 
0 m to 40.5 m above sea level. The average temperature is about 20°C - 35°C with 
a relatively high humidity due to the influence of sea winds. Like any other place in 
Indonesia, Genting Island has two seasons: dry season and rainy season. Dry 
season runs from June until August. Rainy season runs from November through 
March. Transitional season runs from April through May and September through 
October. 
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2.4. Constraints Facing tiie I4LRW lUlanagement 
At this time Indonesia does not liave practical experience handling HLRW. 
Therefore, continuous monitoring of the progress of the technology taking place in 
other countries should be maintained. Accordingly, first-hand experience by training 
of Indonesian's personnel to conduct research and to learn the technical skills would 
be very beneficial. 
The infrastructure that supports transportation of the hazardous materials 
should be built according to the international standards. Regarding radioactive 
materials transportation, Indonesia uses the guidelines of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) with some modifications to suit the conditions in Indonesia. 
IHowever, no specific guidelines have been established regarding IHLRW 
management. 
The development of rules and regulations for HLRW management should be 
done as conservatively as possible. The main purpose of rules and regulations is to 
ensure health and safety for radiation workers and public in large. However, the 
approach must also be practical. The regulations applied in other countries must be 
carefully examined and adopted, whenever necessary. 
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2.5. Regulatory Body of Atomic Energy Activities 
Basic stipulations of atomic energy and its implementing regulations in the 
Indonesia have been based on the Act No. 31, Year 1964. The National Atomic 
Energy Agency (Badan Tenaga Atom Nasional - BATAN) was established in 
accordance with Government Regulation No. 33, Year 1965 [12]. 
The principle function of BATAN is to develop, regulate, monitor, and 
research the application of atomic energy in Indonesia for the safety, health and 
prosperity of Indonesian society [19]. Therefore, BATAN should also initiate the 
promotion of developing NPP programs in the country. 
Regulations by BATAN on principle rules for transporting radioactive 
elements can be found on the regulation No. 07/DJ/5/II/74 [20]. However, 
transportation of HLRW is not specifically discussed in the regulation. 
Besides BATAN, the Department of Demographics and Living Environment 
(Departemen Kependudukan dan Lingkungan Hidup) of the Indonesian Govemment 
has the jurisdiction regarding analyses of the impacts on the environment of a NPP 
121]. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1. The Integrated Repository Performance Assessment 
Many aspects regarding HLRW repository parameters must be addressed in 
order to analyze performances of the repository site. They include near-field 
environment, geosphere, and biosphere conditions. Several papers have discussed 
and investigated the PA of repository sites. 
A paper by Andersson and Norbby discusses the PA program in relation to 
final disposal of spent nuclear fuel and other HLRW. The paper describes five main 
deterministic models to address conceptual uncertainties and coupled effects [22]: 
1. A near-field model. This model describes the transport of radionuclides 
through the buffer zone into a fractured rock matrix. 
2. The groundwater flow and transport code using a finite element method. 
In the model, the rock is considered as porous medium and the flow is 
governed by Darcy's law. 
3. Estimates the variability of flow conditions within a repository region. 
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4. A computer code used for flow and stress analysis in deformable, 
saturated, fractured rock including thermo-hydro-mechanical effects. 
5. A three-dimensional model to analyze mechanical and thermomechanical 
behavior of a repository with surrounding rock due to glaciation and 
thermal loading. 
The purpose of the investigation is to develop and apply the methodology 
that can be used as the basis for developing regulations of HLRW management. 
O'Connel emphasizes the integrated PA of the waste packages and 
engineered barrier system (EBS) at the Yucca Mountain site [23]. The model 
development for single waste packages indicates that the radionuclide release rate 
performance is sensitive to water flux. 
Evaluation of near-field thermal environmental conditions for HLRW in tuff 
geologic medium was done by Altenhofen and Eslinger [24]. A three-dimensional 
heat conduction model for the underground repository facility was used to evaluate 
near-field host rock temperatures throughout the 10,000-year isolation period. The 
result can be seen in Table 3.1. 
Shaw proposed a methodology of HLRW repository PA [25]. The 
methodology is divided into eleven nodes. 
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Table 3.1. Waste Emplacement Design Parameters Used In Repository-Scale 
Thermal Model [24] 
Panel Panel 
Area 
m^(x10®) 
Average 
Age 
Year 
Average 
Heat 
KW/MTU 
Thermal Load 
W/m^ 
Mass Load 
Kg/m^ 
1 0.43 31.3 0.36 13.58 37.22 
2 1.29 29.8 0.52 13.82 26.83 
3 3.00 27.4 0.65 14.23 21.92 
4 3.13 24.8 0.72 14.70 20.53 
5 3.00 23.3 0.84 14.97 17.85 
6 2.35 22.5 0.93 15.11 16.31 
7 1.70 21.9 1.00 15.23 15.25 
8 1.57 21.5 1.03 15.31 14.89 
9 0.85 21.3 1.04 15.35 14.76 
10 0.20 21.3 1.04 15.35 14.76 
11 1.31 20.6 1.07 15.49 14.48 
12 2.22 20.2 1.10 15.57 14.21 
13 2.61 19.6 1.12 15.70 14.05 
14 3.26 18.8 1.14 15.84 13.88 
15 3.66 17.9 1.15 16.05 13.95 
16 3.66 170 1.16 16.25 14.01 
17 3.66 16.3 1.14 16.41 14.37 
18 1.83 - - - -
Node 1 represents the average long hydrologic flux into the repository. Node 
2 represents earthquake-induced canister failures. Node 3 represents water table 
changes caused by earthquakes. Node 4 represents potential occurrences of 
volcanoes in the vicinity of the site. Node 5 represents the water table changes due 
to the volcano scenario. Borehole stability is represented by node 6. The 
distribution of canister lifetime is represented by node 7. Geochemical effects are 
represented by node 8 with uncertainty in the solubility of the Uranium waste. Rock 
fracture modeling is represented by node 9. The representation includes how 
groundwater flow is partitioned between fracture flow and matrix flow. Node 10 
represents the effective porosity of fractured rock, both under fracture flow and 
under matrix flow. The uncertainty in the retardation of nuclides during hydrologic 
transport through the tuff is represented by node 11. The methodology was then 
developed and applied to the Yucca Mountain site. The code is called IMARC [26], 
which is an acronym for Integrated Multiple Assumptions and Release Calculations. 
Figure 3.1 shows the master logic tree for demonstration calculations. The 
methodology employs a logic tree approach to model uncertainties that are used in 
the probabilistic assessment of repository performance. 
The linkage between source term and near-source for high level repository 
PA was conducted by researchers from Risk Engineering, Inc. [27]. The 
assessment was mainly to examine and define the interactions among the source 
term, the near-source region, the effects of temperature variations caused by 
emplacement of waste material, the behavior of the waste containers, and the 
effects on local groundwater hydrology. The study was conducted primarily for the 
Yucca Mountain proposed repository site. Phase II of this study was to further 
explore and elaborate in four areas: waste containment, source term, thermal 
loading, and hydrologic flow [28]. 
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Figure 3.1. i\/laster Logic Tree for Demonstration Calculations [251 
A more general model for Integrated PA has been developed by Golder 
Associates, Inc. [7]. The computer code is called RIP, which stands for Repository 
Integration Program. It concentrates on the integration of the entire system, and 
utilizes relatively high-level descriptive models and parameters. The integration 
consists of four coupled components that address waste package behavior and 
radionuclide release, fluid flow and radionuclide transport through the geosphere, 
disruptive events that can affect system parameters, and radionuclide fate and 
effect in the biosphere. The RIP computer code is employed to conduct TSPA of 
the proposed repository site at southern tip of Genting island, Karimunjawa 
archipelago, Central Java, Indonesia. The complete analysis is described in great 
detail on Chapter 5. 
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The identification of fault displacement hazards and seismic hazards of a 
geologic repository was pointed out by McConnell [29]. The paper outlined 
appropriate investigations that can be used to identify fault displacement hazards 
and seismic hazards at a geologic repository. The identification leads to three types 
of faults. Type III faults are the faults located outside the controlled area and 
require no further investigation. Type II faults are the faults located in the controlled 
area or outside the controlled area but may affect isolation within the controlled 
area. These may be subject to further investigation. The faulting that occurred 
during the Quarternary Period is considered characteristic of the controlled area. 
This is considered Type I and subject to further investigation. 
3.2. The Near-field Environmental Conditions 
Andersson suggests that the near-field region of a geological repository is a 
spatially complex region composed of both engineered and natural barrier materials 
[22]. The functional requirements for geological disposal of nuclear waste are: 
1. The waste must not be released to the biosphere at a rate or in 
concentrations deemed to present an unacceptable hazard. 
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2. The waste must be removed and isolated from the effects of human 
activity or catastrophic natural events. 
3. The technology to implement disposal must be readily available, and 
achievable at a reasonable cost. 
4. The potential future retrieval of some types of disposed nuclear wastes 
if so required by national policy. 
5. The process that control safe performance of nuclear waste disposal 
must be sufficiently well characterized and understood for modeling, 
and adequate, relevant data can be obtained and used in such models 
to reliably demonstrate predicted performance. 
To meet the regulatory requirements, the predominant role of the engineered 
barriers system (EBS) has gained a growing consensus worldwide. The 
uncertainties of the performance of natural phenomena lead to the design of the 
EBS using a multiple-barrier approach. In this concept, a series of engineered and 
natural barriers is nested one inside the other. A schematic of the EBS can be seen 
in Figure 3.2. The innermost barrier is the waste form. The outer layers are a 
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container, a backfill or buffer, and the geologic formation. The primary function of 
the waste form matrix is to immobilize the radioactive materials. The container is 
used to isolate the nuclear waste from groundwater for a designated period of time. 
The backfill or buffer is used to reduce possible tectonic shearing forces on 
containers, prevent the container from settling within the emplacement tunnel, 
conduct heat from the engineered barriers, filter fine particles and colloids that may 
form during waste package reactions, retard the diffusional-transport rate of 
dissolved radionuclides, and chemically buffer the composition of intruding 
groundwater [30]. 
Host 
Rock 
High-Level 
Waste 
Container/ Canister 
Buffer/ Backfill 
Figure 3.2. Schematic of Engineered Barriers System [31] 
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3.2.1. Source-term of the Waste Package 
The Characteristic Database System (LWR assemblies database by United 
States DOE) can be used to determine the abundance of radionuclides in a spent 
fuel assembly as a function of burnup [14]. However, the information is not 
adequate. The uncertainty of location of radionuclides in the spent fuel is high 
because the location of these radionuclides is not uniform. The researchers have 
estimated the proportion of the key radionuclides within the separate region of spent 
fuel [31]. This information is important to understand the release pathway of a 
particular radionuclide to the environment. Figure 3.3 shows the compositions of 
the key radionuclides within fuel assembly before and after fissioning take place. 
prodncta 
Figure 3.3. Schematic Diagram of Spent Fuel Showing Different Source Region with 
Characteristic Radionuclides [31] 
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Einziger discusses the key factors that affect the spent fuel source term. 
They are fuel and cladding oxidation, cladding splitting kinetics, cladding rupture 
(breach) kinetics, and the physical parameters of the fuel [32]. The model was then 
developed to calculate the amount of fuel oxidized from UO2 and U3O8 as a function 
of time and temperature when canister and rod breaches. The model is applicable 
for temperature ranges from 100°C to 300°C. The study shows that below 200°C, 
the preponderance of total splitting time is due to incubation. Below 150°C, the 
cladding oxidizes completely before the cladding crack can propagate down the 
complete rod. Below 100°C, the spent fuel Is not expected to form U3O8 during the 
lifetime of a potential repository. Above 300°C, all fuel cladding can be considered 
as oxidized to Zr02 and the fuel oxidized to U3O8 in a repository time frame. 
Manaktala pointed out several characteristics of the spent fuel, cladding, and 
the waste package that are likely to influence the long-term performance of spent 
fuel in a geologic repository but may not be adequately addressed in current PA 
models [33]. For instance, the increase of surface area of fuel as a result of pellet 
cracking may not be adequately addressed. This information is important to 
determine the release of radionuclides from the fuel upon contact with water. Other 
information related to the distribution of fission products and actinides in the 
discharged fuel is valuable for the development of release models. Most studies 
related to the failure of the waste package have concentrated on the corrosion 
failure of metallic container as a result of contact of groundwater with the container. 
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These studies do not address electrochemical effects between the fuel, the 
cladding, and other waste package components. The possible detrimental effects of 
waste package materials on the spent-fuel degradation kinetics need to be 
considered in development of the source-term models. 
3.2.2. Temperature Conditions at Waste Pactiage 
The analyses of thermo-hydrological behavioral of some areal mass loadings 
were done by Buscheck for the Yucca Mountain site [34]. The examination was 
completed to estimate the temporal and spatial extent of the temperature and 
saturation changes during the first 100,000 years. Three primary strategies for 
thermal loading were introduced; 
1. The possibility to limit thermal load and distribute it such that it has 
no impact on hydrological performance 
2. The impact of thermo-hydrological process for intermediate thermal 
loads to the geological disposal system 
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3. The impact of thermo-hydrological process for high thermal loads to 
the geological disposal system 
The calculations were done using computer code called V-TOUGH 
(Vectorized Transport of Unsaturated Groundwater and Heat). The other issue 
raised in the report was the challenge to adequately understand repository heat-
driven vapor and condensate flow utilizing data from long-term in situ heater tests. 
This is required to determine the potential for the major repository-heat-driven 
sources of fracture flow to impact waste package performance and radionuclide 
transport. 
The thermal conditions in the vicinity of the waste package are important 
factors in predicting container corrosion and radionuclide dissolution processes as 
reported by Lingineni [35]. The study determines waste package temperatures from 
the time history of the average repository temperature. The repository is assumed 
to be a rectangular panel that has dimension 427 m X 937 m. 
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3.2.3. The UC System 
The robust waste package design has been introduced to fulfill the multiple 
barrier concept. One of the designs was presented by Doering [36]. Each bamer in 
this design contributes to the overall performance of the package. It is expected 
that the robust waste package design will provide complete containment and 
isolation for more than 1000 years. Figure 3.4 shows the conceptual design. 
3.S-INCH THICK 
OUTER CASE 
1PWR 500-INCH THICK INTERNAL LINER 
21 PWR BASKET 
ASSEMBLY I 
21 PWRs 
INTERNAL UD 
OUTER LID 
Figure 3.4. Multi-Barrier Robust Waste Package Design [36] 
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One of the most important factors regarding the material selection Is the 
ability to minimize the possibility of failure of the waste package over some period of 
time. The material degradation can be caused by oxidation or corrosion. The two 
basic metallic containment barriers are corrosion-allowance materials and 
corrosion-resistant materials. In the MPC concepts, the outer barrier uses a 
corrosion allowance material and the Inner barrier uses a corrosion resistant 
material [37]. 
Stuart described the MPC designed by Nuclear Assurance Corporation 
(NAC) that has been reviewed by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) 
[38]. Some advantages of the NAC design include high capacity of spent fuel In a 
single transportable package, criticality control, and sufficient heat transfer capability 
to keep cladding temperatures within the regulatory limits. The fuel parameters can 
be as high as 4.2% U235 initial enrichment, residual heat content as high as 45,000 
MWd/MTU, and a decay heat as short as 6.5 years. The weight of the fully loaded 
package and its accessories is maintained to be less than 125 tons for all handling 
conditions. The container design can be seen In Figure 3.5. 
The design was tested using several different computer codes. The ANSYS 
code was used to analyze the structural model using finite element. In the shielding 
analysis the use of XSDRNPM and MORSE (Monte Carlo methodology) were used. 
In this study, approximately 12 million neutrons and gammas were tracked through 
the shielding model. The tests incorporated two types of scenarios. First, the test 
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for storage of spent fuel at reactor site followed by transporting the container to 
another location where it may be stored for extended period of time. Second, 
testing of the possibility for immediate transport of the cask. In addition to that, 
demonstration of containment integrity was also conducted. 
ROIATIOH 
TRUNNION (lYP) 
CASK BODY-
NEUlRQN SIHEID 
LiniNC IRUMNIOM { I  IP) 
PrtOPBIfTABY 
INrORUAIIOlI 
CASK LID 
Figure 3.5. NAC-STC Dual Purpose Cask [38] 
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3.2.4. The EBS Failure Modeling 
The EBS is the waste package and the engineered barrier in which the waste 
package is emplaced. The performance of the EBS must also be evaluated to 
determine its reliability. Since it is expected to perform adequately for approximately 
100000 years, many EBS failure models have been introduced. 
Bullen has completed several studies to determine the impact of container 
failure mechanisms and container failure rates on radionuclide release rates from 
the EBS [39,40,41,42,43]. These efforts use a mathematical model to predict the 
cumulative failure distribution for the Containment Barrier System (CBS) employed 
in a deep geological facility. The model can incorporate several designs from 
single, thin-walled metal barriers to multiple, redundant barriers and also thick-
walled containment. The cumulative failure rate is considered as a function of the 
mean container lifetime, the threshold container failure time, and the failure rate at 
the mean container lifetime. These parameters are the variables in Weibull and 
exponential distributions. In addition, the model also includes factors to describe 
containers failed at emplacement, early failure rate, and the effects of multiple, 
concurrent repository environments on the performance of the entire container 
population [40]. Previous evaluations completed on the CBS with this mathematical 
model include single metal alloy 825 container, a multiple barrier container 
consisting of titanium clad. Alloy C-4, and carbon steel containers. The results show 
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that the use of a multiple barrier container will delay the failure time as much as 50% 
longer than single barrier container [40]. The multiple barrier system using alloy 825 
and steel container appears superior in design reliability. This is due to the 
robustness and the nature of redundancy that are employed. Figure 3.6 shows the 
cumulative failure distribution for multiple barrier, single bamer Alloy 825, and single 
barrier steel containers. The dominant heat transfer mechanism in this study is 
conduction and the areal power density is 114 KW/acre. 
Container Effects, 114 kW/Acre, Conduction, No Clad 
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Figure 3.6. Cumulative Container Failure Distribution for Multiple Barrier, 
Alloy 825, and Steel Containers with Conduction Heat Transfer 
and Areal Power Density of 114 KW/acre [40] 
Three different thermal regions have been developed by Bullen for three 
thermal loading scenario, namely 36 KW/acre, 57 KW/acre, and 114 KW/acre. 
These thermal regions are applied for conduction, convection, and heat-pipe 
thermal redistribution mechanisms. 
3.3. Materials Selection for HLRW Container 
Regarding the materials for a potential HLRW container McCright has done 
some testing for conceptual metal barrier materials for a tuff repository [44]. Initially, 
17 alloys were selected as the candidate materials using criteria such as 
mechanical properties, weldability, corrosion resistance, and cost. After the alloys 
were ranked, the team decided to consider four materials for further investigation. 
They are AISI 304L, 321,316L, and Alloy 825. Besides the stainless-steel based 
alloys, the copper-base materials were also considered, namely CDA102 (oxygen-
free copper), CDA 613 (aluminum bronze), and CDA 715 (70-30 copper-nickel). 
The nominal compositions of these materials can be seen in Table 3.2 and Table 
3.3. 304L and other austenistic alloys are expected to show excellent general 
corrosion resistance in aerated dry steam environments, in wet steam, and in 
vadose water [44]. The limiting factor for using 304L is the possibility of much more 
rapid penetration via localized or stress-assisted forms of corrosion. 
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Table 3.2. Materials Composition for Austenitic Alloys [44,46] 
Chemical Compositions (wt %) 
Materials C Mn Cr Ni Other elements 
304L 0.03 (max) 2.0 (max) 18-20 (max) 8-12 (max) 
316L 0.03 (max) 2.0 (max) 16-18 (max) 10-14 (max) 2 - 3 % Mo 
321 0.08 (max) 2.0 (max) 17-19 (max) 9-12 (max) 9-12 (5X%C) 
Ti min 
825 0.05 (max) 1.0 (max) 19.5-23.5 (max) 38-46 (max) Mo; 2.5 - 3.5 
Ti: 0.6 -1.2 
Cu: 1.5-3.0 
Al: 0.2 max 
Table 3.3. Materials Composition for Copper and Copper-Based Alloys [44] 
Chemical Compositions (wt %) 
Materials Cu Fe Pb Sn Al Mn Ni Zn 
CDA102 99.95 - - - -
(min) 
CDA613 92.7 3.5 - 0.2-0.5 6.0-8.0 0.5 0.5 -
(nom) (max) 
CDA715 69.5 0.4-0.7 0.5 1.0 29.0-33.0 1.0 
(nom) (max) (max) (max) 
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However, Alloy 825 contains 2-3% Mo and is Ti-stabilized to combat localized 
and intergranular forms of corrosion. The copper and copper-base alloys show 
several advantages, co-exist thermodynamically with water (under some 
conditions), the driving force for corrosion and oxidation is smaller, and localized 
corrosion is less severe [44,45]. However, in high gamma radiation field the 
corrosion and oxidation rates of these materials are higher [45]. High gamma 
radiation field occur during early part of the containment period. 
General corrosion rates for austenitic stainless steel materials have been 
determined for 304L, 316L, and Alloy 825 [44]. These data were drawn from an 
exposure of the materials in water at different temperatures under radiation 
environment for two month period. The exposure data for 304L in the irradiated 
environments can be seen in Table 3.4. The corrosion rates can be seen in Table 
3.5. 
Table 3,4. Oxidation Test Results for 304L in Irradiated Environments [44] 
Corrosion penetration rate (nm/yr) 
304L (Solution annealed and heat-
treated condition) 
304L (Solution annealed) 
Materials = Environment = 
water and tuff 
water and tuff 
water 
water 
105°C 
3x105 rads/hr 
0.31 ; 0.31 
0.29:0.32 
0.23:0.37 
0.25; 0.30 
6 X105 rads/hr 
lOS'C 
0.31 
0.36 
0.51 
0.55 
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Table 3.5. General Corrosion Rates for Austenitic Stainless Steels In Water at 
Different Temperatures [44] 
Alloy Temp (°C) Time (hr) Medium Corrosion rate (nwJyr) 
Average Std. Dev. 
304L 50 11,512 water 0.13 0.02 
316L 50 11,512 water 0.15 0.01 
825 50 11,512 water 0.21 0.01 
304L 80 11,056 water 0.09 0.01 
316L 80 11,056 water 0.11 0.01 
825 80 11,056 water 0.11 0.01 
304L 100 10,360 water 0.07 0.02 
316L 100 10,360 water 0.04 0.01 
825 100 10,360 water 0.05 0.02 
McCrlght reported that copper is expected to resist attack by pure steam [45]. 
However, if facilitated by oxygen, tlie corrosion may occur. Figure 3.7 shows the 
effect of nickel on the corrosion of copper-nickel alloys in oxygen-containing water 
and steam at saturated pressure. 
The report concludes that copper-nickel alloys typically corrode in dry and 
good-quality wet steam at rates less than 2.54 tim/yr. When temperature is in the 
range between 300°C and 350°C, a sharp increase in corrosion rate is expected to 
take place. 
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3.4. Assessment of Disruptive Events 
As equally Important as understanding the aspects in the near-field 
conditions is an assessment of the possibilities of occurrences of natural 
catastrophic phenomena within disposal facility. The assessment of volcanic and 
tectonic hazards to the waste repositories for Yucca Mountain site was conducted 
by Wallmann [47]. The analyses were conducted using the computer code RiP [7]. 
The events are specified as a disruptive rate (events/year), event characteristics 
and magnitude, and consequences associated with an event. The results show that 
the disruptive events have no visible effect on the overall release, which is 
dominated by C-14. 
Davidson discussed the dominant pathways for the large circulation of 
groundwater through the granite batholith. Low-dipping fracture zones are the most 
dominant pathway [48]. In the fracture zones, the permeabilities can vary by as 
much as 6 orders of magnitude over lateral distances of only a few meters. The 
regions with high permeability are associated with low stress magnitudes, whereas 
regions of low permeability correspond to the locations with high stress magnitude. 
Ahokas shows that fracture zones control hydraulic head and groundwater 
flow [49]. Simulations and modeling of fracture zones were also done on fractured 
crystalline rock using discrete-fracture model [50,51]. 
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4. TSPA METHODOLOGY FOR THE GENTING ISLAND 
REPOSITORY SITE 
4.1. Identification of Source Terms/Inventory of HLRW 
The identification of the estimated radionuclide inventory, or source term, is a 
very important parameter in PA due to the potential impact of the release of these 
radionuclides to the AE. These radionuclides will be encapsulated into waste-forms 
which have high mechanical integrity, low solubility, low surface area exposed to 
water, and low solid-phase diffusion rates. However, the radionuclides are expected 
to diffuse to the waste-form surface if brought into contact with groundwater. One 
potential mechanism for radionuclide release is long-term dissolution of the UOafuel 
matrix. Another release mechanism is diffusion of radionuclides along the surface 
of grains and cracks in the fuel. 
The waste-form is assumed to be spent fuel assemblies from PWR reactors. 
The waste package design includes a modified MPC design with 10 cm of carbon 
steel surrounded by 1 cm of Alloy 825. 
It is projected that 10 NPPs will be built in Muria Peninsula, Central Java, 
over the next 25 years beginning in the year 2004. After the first NPP reaches the 
end of its design life (2036), the number of spent fuel assemblies (SFA) which will 
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have already accumulated will be 7,489 assemblies. Each small MPC design can 
hold 9 PWR fuel assemblies, then the required number of containers will be 
approximately 850 containers. 
Table 4.1 shows 13 long-lived radionuclides that will remain in the waste-form 
for very long times (over 10000 years) which have 3.27% initial enrichment and 
33,000 MWd/MTHIM burnup. Table 4.2 shows the total number SFA of PWR 
calculated. 
Table 4.1. The Significant Inventory of Radionuclides in the SFA [14] 
Decay Time Curies/MTIHM (Yrare) 
C14 Se79 Tc99 1129 Cs135 Ra226 U234 U235 U238 Np237 Pu239 Pu240 PU242 
1 1.39 4.9e-1 1.6e1 3.8e-2 5.6e-1 5.8e-8 1.2 1.8e-2 3.1e-1 4.8e-1 4.0e2 5.8e2 2.2 
10 1.39 4.9e-1 1.6e1 3.8e-2 5.6e-1 4.3e-7 1.3 1.8e-2 3.1e-1 4.9e-1 4.0e2 5.8e2 Z2 
20 1.39 4.9e-1 1.6e1 3.8e-2 5.6e-1 1.3e-6 1.4 1.8e-2 3.1e-1 5.0e-1 4.0e2 5.8e2 2.2 
30 1.39 4.9e-1 1.6e1 3.8e-2 5.6e-1 2.7e-6 1.5 1.8e-2 3.1e-1 5.1e-1 4.0e2 5.9e2 2.2 
50 1.39 4.9e-1 1.6e1 3.8e-2 5.6e-1 7.3e-6 1.7 1.8e-2 3.1e-1 5.4e-1 4.0e2 5.9e2 2.2 
100 1.37 4.9e-1 1.Ge1 3.8e-2 5.6e-1 3.0e-5 2.0 1.8e-2 3.1e-1 6.1e-1 4.0e2 5.8e2 2.2 
200 1.36 4.9e-1 1.6e1 3.8e-2 5.6e-1 1.4e-4 2.4 1.8e-2 3.1e-1 7.5e-1 4.0e2 5.8e2 2.2 
300 1.34 4.9e-1 1.6e1 3.8e-2 5.6e-1 3.3e-4 2.6 1.8e-2 3.1e-1 8.8e-1 4.0e2 5.7e2 2.2 
500 1.31 4.9e-1 1.6e1 3.8e-2 5.6e-1 9.9e-4 2.7 1.8e-2 3.1e-1 1,1 3.9e2 5.6e2 2.2 
1000 1.23 4.9e-1 1.6e1 3.8e-2 5.6e-1 4.1e-3 2.8 1.9e-2 3.1e-1 1.3 3.ge2 5.3e2 2.2 
2000 1.09 4.8e-1 1.5e1 3.8e-2 5.6e-1 1.5e-2 2.8 1.9e-2 3.1e-1 1.5 3.8e2 4.8e2 2.2 
5000 7.6e-1 4.7e-1 1.5e1 3.8e-2 5.6e-1 7.1e-2 2.7 2.0e-2 3.1e-1 1.6 3.5e2 3.5e2 2.1 
10000 4.2e-1 4.4e-1 1.5e1 3.8e-2 5.6e-1 1.8e-1 2.6 2.26-2 3.1e-1 1.6 3.0e2 2.1e2 2.1 
20000 1.2e-1 4.0e-1 1.Se1 3.8e-2 5.6e-1 4.0e-1 2.5 Z4e-2 3.1e-1 1.6 2.3e2 7.1e1 2.0 
50000 3.3e-3 2.9e-1 1.3e1 3.8e-2 5.5e-1 9.5e-1 2.2 2.9e-2 3.1e-1 1.5 9.7e1 ^9 2.0 
100000 7.7e-6 1.7e-1 l.lel 3.8e-2 5.4e-1 1.5 1.7 3.1e-2 3.1e-1 1.5 2.3e1 1.5e-2 1.8 
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Table 4.2. Number of Spent Fuel Generated 
YearofOperatii on Planti 1 Piant2 i>lant3 I |)|ant4 Piant5 1 Plant6 1 Plant? Plants Plant9 1 Plant 10 T(  ^
2004-2006 spent 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 
2006-200! spent 128 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 192 
200^2010 spent 182 12S 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 384 
2010-2012 spent 256 192 128 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 640 
2012-2014 spent 320 256 192 128 64 0 0 0 0 0 960 
2014-2016 spent 384 320 256 192 128 64 0 0 0 0 1344 
2016-2018 spent 448 384 320 256 192 128 64 0 0 0 1792 
2018-2020 spent 512 44S 384 320 256 192 128 64 0 0 2304 
2020-2022 spent 576 512 448 384 320 256 192 128 64 0 2880 
2022-2024 spent 640 576 512 448 384 320 256 192 128 64 3520 
2024-2026 spent 704 640 576 512 448 384 320 256 192 128 4160 
2026-2028 spent 768 704 640 576 512 448 384 320 256 192 4800 
m2030 spent 832 768 704 640 576 512 448 384 320 256 5440 
2030-2032 spent 896 832 768 704 640 576 512 448 384 320 6080 
2032-2034 spent 960 896 832 768 704 640 576 512 448 384 6720 
2034-2036 spent 1153 960 896 832 768 704 640 576 512 448 7489 
(final core) 
2036-2038 spent 0 1153 960 896 832 768 704 640 576 512 7041 
(final core) 
2038-2040 spent 0 0 1153 960 896 832 768 704 640 576 6529 
(final core) 
2040-2042 spent 0 0 0 1153 960 896 832 768 704 640 5953 
(fbialcore) 
2042-2044 spent 0 0 0 0 
J 
1153 
ffinsi 
960 896 832 768 704 5313 
2044  ^ spent 0 0 0 
\ 
0 
[Iinai wvi6j 
0 1153 960 896 832 768 4609 
(final core) 
2046-2048 spoit 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 
1153 960 896 
ffinsi 
832 3841 
2048-2050 spent 0 0 0 0 0 
\ 
0 
[lUlalvwicj 
0 1153 960 
/AHSIMMI 
896 3009 
20S0-2!152 spent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1153 
/flndl 
960 2113 
2052-2054 spent 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i^UMJWViCy 
0 0 0 1153 1153 
(Iniaicore) 
Each reactor contrliiutes=1153 spent (Uel assemblies the reactor Bfettme 
Total number of fuel assemblies -1153 X10=11,530 spent fuel assembSes 
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4.2. Site Selection Criteria 
Tliere are two options for siting a deep geologic repository site. These 
include placement of the facility in the unsaturated zone (above the groundwater 
table) and placement in the saturated zone (below the groundwater table). The 
proposed repository at Genting Island, however, can be best designed such that the 
wastes are emplaced in the saturated zone since the site has a relatively shallow 
groundwater table. 
The approach for site selection is also impacted by the thermal loading of the 
waste packages. There are two thermal loading strategies being considered: high-
temperature loading where the surface temperature of the container exceeds the 
boiling point of water, and ambient-temperature loading where the container 
surface temperature is maintained below the boiling point of water. 
4.2.1. Design of the Repository Site 
The proposed design for the HLRW repository site at the southern tip of 
Genting Island, can be described by dividing the site into two areas or rings. The 
inner ring will contain a group of waste packages with an areal power density of 
approximately 100 KW/acre. This region is called the high temperature ring. The 
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outer ring contains a group of waste packages with an area! power density of 
approximately 30 KW/acre, which represents the ambient temperature ring. The 
inner ring includes 75% of the waste packages and the outer ring includes the 
remaining waste-packages. Figure 4.1 shows schematically the proposed design of 
the repository site. 
Waste (heated area) 
Rock (unheated area) 
Figure 4.1. Schematic Diagram of the Cross Section of Area 
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The geological map of Karimunjawa archipelago can be seen in Figure 4.2 
[18]. The groundwater level at Genting Island is considered shallow. It is influenced 
by the sea level and the rainfall rate. Figure 4.3 shows the groundwater level map 
of the southern tip of Genting Island [18]. 
The lithology of the area is such that the top layer of soil is mainly alluvium 
consisting of pebble, gravel, clay, coral limestone and coarse grained rocks. The 
thickness of this layer is approximately between 1.5 - 3.5 m. Below the layer is 
basalt, which consists of basaltic lava or alkaline basalts. The thickness of the layer 
is approximately between 24 - 35 m. The depth to groundwater is approximately 
103 m. 
The basaltic rock at Genting Island is classified as a strong rock. In the area, 
it is found that the approximate strength is 1550.36 kg/m i^n compression. Basaltic 
rock is favorable because of its strength and the interlocking of fracture blocks, 
which can limit displacement along fractures. Therefore, the diffusion time of 
radionuclides along the rock fractures can be delayed, that eventually It will take 
longer for the radionuclides to reach the AE. 
58 
P.SINTOK 
P.GUNOU. Tmpv, 
J>.KEMUJAN 
P.CENDIKIAN 
Tmpv. 
H KECIL 
Tmp* >9C«I 
P. KARIMUNJAWA 
P.GENTING 
P.SERUNI 
'mpb 
.20' 
P.BATU 
P.MENJANGAN KECr 
IP.MENJANSAN BESAR 
Figure 4.2. The Geological Map of Karimunjawa Archipelago [18] 
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// 
Figure 4.3. The Groundwater Level Map of the Genting Island [18] 
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Having minimal permeability in the geologic medium is very important. The 
coefficient of permeability determines the ability of a material to let a liquid pass 
through its cross-sectional area. Permeability is defined as the discharge that 
occurs through a unit cross-section of aquifer under a hydraulic gradient of 1.00 and 
has units of speed (m/s) [52]. The permeability measurements from Genting island 
are summarized in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3. The Coefficient of Permeability [18] 
Coefficient of Permeability (m/s) Type of Rocks 
1.82X10-6 Soil and Basalt 
1.75X10-6 Basalt 
1.26X10-7 Basalt 
5.55X10-6 Basalt 
4.79X10-6 Basalt 
The water chemistry of Genting Island shows that the concentrations of Mg^" ,^ 
Na" ,^ and CI" are rather high at the coastal area. The content of HCO3' tends to 
increase on the southern side of the Island. The existence of HCOa" in the 
groundwater is due to the influence of decomposed plants and swamp materials. 
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The geotechnical investigation shows that the intact roci<s can be classified 
Into^e^af sWngths. The classifications of strength are very soft, soft, medium, 
strong, and very strong. The unconfined compression strength value is 360.86 
kg/cm .^ The mean value of Poissons ratio is 0.31. The mean value of the natural 
density is 2.797 g/cm®. The mean value of cohesiveness is 57.87 kg/cm .^ Table 
4.4 shows the results of the investigation. 
The southern side of the Genting Island is primarily a volcanic cone region. 
The highest point of this area is 40.5 m above mean sea level, while the lowest point 
is about 5.0 m above mean sea level. 
Table 4.4. Technical Classification of Intact Rocks [18] 
Classification of Strength Uniaxial Compressive 
Strength (Kg/cm^) 
Type of Rock 
Very soft 10-250 Limestone, Salt rock 
Soft 250 - 500 Coal, Silstone, Schist 
Medium 500-1000 Sandstone, Slate, Shale 
Strong 1000-2000 Marble, Granite 
Very strong >2000 Quartz, Basalt 
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4.2.2. Near-Field Conditions 
Near-field conditions refer to environmental factors, such as pH, water 
contact mode, temperature, etc. Table 4.5 gives the summary of the best estimates 
of the sorption properties and solubilities of the principal radionuclides as affected 
by the geochemical environments of the near-field mineralogy. 
In the model, pH, water contact mode, and temperature are included. 
Regarding pH, along the 50 m depth of an experimental borehole, the pH varies 
from 7.7 to 6.8. The average pH is 7.25, which can be considered neutral. For the 
saturated zone, the water contact mode can be divided into two categories: zero 
velocity-leading to diffusive transport, and high velocity-leading to advective 
transport. Since Genting Island is an ocean island, it is most likely that the water 
contact mode will lead to primarily diffusive transport. 
Pathway analyses of Genting Island show that radionuclides can only be 
transported from the site in groundwater. Therefore, this study employs the 
groundwater pathway as the most dominant pathway. The exclusion zone, as 
required by the law, is 5 km. However, in this study, the exclusion zone is 
conservatively assumed to be only 1 km. No biotic transport mechanisms are 
available in this design except for transport of radionuclide by bioaccumulation in 
marine life. 
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Table 4.5. Relative Solubilities and Retardation Factors of Selected Elements 
in Various Geologic Media [53] 
Se 
Sr 
Zr 
Tc 
Sn 
Sb 
Cs 
Pb 
Ra 
Th 
U 
Np 
Pu 
Am 
Solubility (log ppm) Retardation Factor (1 + lOKJ 
Reducing: Eh--0.2 Oxidizing; Eh- C
M 9 Clay. 
Most Prob. pH-9 pH-6 pH-9 pH-6 Granite Basalt Tuff Soil Salt 
-3(?) 
- - - - 5 5 5 5 20 
50 50 50 50 200 
200 200 200 200 1000 
high -0.2 high -0.2 high 10 50 20 50 1 
200 200 200 200 10 
2000 2000 10000 5000 100 
-4 
-
-6 -4 -6 500 500 500 500 300 
5000 5000 5000 5000 1000 
30000 10000 10000 50000 5000 
-3 -10 high high high 1 1 1 1 
5 5 5 5 5 
40 40 100 20 20 
-3 -4 -4 -4 -4 100 100 200 200 100 
1000 1000 1000 1000 100 
5000 5000 5000 5000 1000 
-3(?) 
- - - - 10 10 10 10 5 
100 100 100 100 50 
1000 1000 1000 1000 500 
high high high high high 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 50 1 1 1 
high high high high high 100 100 60 200 1 
1000 1000 500 1000 10 
10000 10000 10000 20000 2000 
-1 -1 0 -1 0 10 20 20 20 5 
50 50 50 50 20 
200 500 500 500 100 
-2 -3 -1 3 -1 50 50 50 50 5 
500 500 500 500 50 
5000 5000 5000 5000 500 
-3 -4 -4 -4 -4 500 500 500 500 300 
5000 5000 5000 5000 1000 
10000 10000 10000 50000 5000 
-3 -3 -5 high high 10 20 5 50 10 
50 50 40 200 20 
500 1000 2C0 5000 60 
-3 -4 -4 -2 -2 10 10 10 10 10 
100 100 100 100 50 
500 500 500 400 300 
-3 -5 -4 -5 -3 10 100 50 500 10 
200 500 200 1000 200 
5000 5000 5000 20000 10000 
-4(?) -8 -5 -8 -5 500 60 300 200 300 
3000 500 1000 800 1000 
50000 50000 50000 50000 5000 
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4.3. Waste Package Selection 
The waste package technology currently proposed for the Genting Island site 
employs the UC System. It is an integrated system in which spent fuel assemblies 
can be loaded and sealed in multi-assembly containers at the reactor site or at a 
receiving facility [5]. The spent fuel is then stored, transported, and finally emplaced 
in the ultimate repository without ever reopening the container. The proposed UC 
system can employ two types of waste package designs: the Multi-Purpose 
Container (MPC) design and the Multi-Element Sealed Canister (MESC) design. 
Both designs have advantages such as: 
1. High capacity for spent fuel in a single transportable package. 
2. Criticality control with burnup credit. 
3. Sufficient heat transfer capability to keep cladding temperatures 
within regulatory limits. 
4. The number of required handling steps and procedures are 
significantly reduced. 
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The conceptual EBS and its associated isolation processes can be seen in 
Figure 4.4. The container shown in this figure is called the small MPC design. This 
figure shows schematically the innermost set of barriers that include the waste form, 
corrosion-allowance barrier and corrosion-resistant barrier. 
Figure 4.4. Schematic Diagram of Small MPC Design [5] 
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4.3.1. Possible Failure Mechanisms of the Containment Barrier Systems 
The EBS includes the waste package and the near-field region in which the 
waste package will be emplaced. The performance of the EBS must be evaluated 
to determine the failure rate of containers as a function of time. This container 
failure rate is an important parameter in the PA analyses of the long-term 
performance of the site. The container failure mode is assumed to be general 
corrosion for the carbon steel and pitting corrosion for the corrosion resistant 
materials. The cladding failure mode is assumed to be creep rupture. 
A schematic representation of an emplaced container and possible corrosion 
and degradation mechanisms can be seen in Figure 4.5. 
ruMlbIa C>«WIM Sii* U U»d«rcw( W«I<1 
PoMitiU Coaif>o»l(lcM>*l. Mlci«iUuc<u#«] DilT«»«iir«t Beeaufte e( WHJsljr 
T i^uuairuMtiral ChMgM la llaai Aneei«a la 
Piia p«eler«MiallyOrow U I>W«ctlo« Or»wiry 
rtntts Uaeft 
no4i*^  riM 
Oatwanie C«r«o«lo« 
M«iaU UM4 
rankra W«l«a Xom 
•t U mot Stie4» Rclieitft4 
lUfg} 
PouAila CowtvoAllloaal DUf«(c»eca MctKl wmJ f^ «r Kl«i*l tot W«I4 
Ac* S«teu fistMfK C*cvi«« Sitft* 
KaUt* Inn 0«««i V*l«« I.C>C|(«** SfMAt Pu*l CladJiMCCaaMlMsllwnMil 
Figure 4.5. The Emplaced Waste Package Container, Possible Corrosion and 
Degradation Problems [44] 
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4.4. Dose/Risk Evaluation 
As the first step of modeling radiation dose, Dose I risk evaluation is the 
calculation of drinking-water doses. The calculation is relatively straightforward, that 
the release rate from the RIP calculation is multiplied by the dose-conversion factors 
provided. The conversion factors are extracted from the table of the study 
conducted by INTERA Inc., SANDIA Report for the Yucca Mountain project, and the 
use of GENII computer code [54,55,56]. These dose-conversion factors are based 
on the ICRP 30 (International Council on Radiation Protection) standards and are 
employed to RIP computer code. The listing of theses dose-conversion factors from 
SANDIA REPORT can be seen in Appendix A. 
The average annual dose to individual group can be calculated using the 
following equation: 
Dose = Xl.(On(.C) (4.1) 
J r 
DF = annual effective dose equivalent of receptor group g from all 
radionuclides present in all pathways (rems/(iaCi/L)). 
C = concentration of each radionuclide presents in the pathways (nCi/Liters). 
68 
The concentration of the radionuclides are based on the mean release rates of 
these Isotopes to the AE (Cl/yr.). The average volumetric flow rate of the 
groundwater (liters/yr.) are given. Therefore, the concentration of each isotope in 
the AE can be determined. 
Two calculations will be done with regard to dose evaluation. Firstly, the 
calculation without incorporating seawater dilution factor, and the other is when the 
seawater dilution factor is incorporated. 
4.5. Disruptive Event Scenario 
The disruptive events scenarios for the island are assumed to be flooding of 
the repository and disruption of the repository by earthquakes. There is no volcanic 
activity in the area. Since the area is remote, if either disruptive event occurs, the 
resulting radionuclide release from the site will be limited by the significant dilution 
effects of the ocean. This dilution will prevent significant radiological impacts. The 
ocean will mitigate the impact of any radionuclide leakage from repository due to 
geohydrological factors [57]. The primary benefit that is derived from an ocean 
island repository is the protective mechanism resulting from the great dilution of any 
release of radionuclides from the repository into the surrounding seawater. 
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5. TSPA ANALYSES OF THE GENTING ISLAND REPOSITORY FACILITY 
In this study, the RIP computer code is used to conduct the PA analyses of 
the Genting Island repository facility. The code employs "top-down" approach. This 
approach relies on the expert interpretation of the available data about the 
repository facility. It integrates the entire system and utilizes relatively high-level 
descriptive models and parameters. In this study, the RIP code employs 1,000 
Monte Carlo realizations to evaluate possible events based upon statistical 
distributions to describe each scenario. The time histories recorded for this study 
are up to 100000 years following initial emplacement of the waste containers. 
5.1. Assumptions 
In order to conduct the analyses for the proposed facility, several 
assumptions must be made. The assumptions are: 
Near-field environment: 
1. The pathway length is conservatively assumed to be only 1 km. 
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2. The waste packages are emplaced in the saturated zone (below the 
groundwater table). 
3. The most dominant pathway is groundwater flow. 
4. The facility is 2.6 km long and 800 m wide. The total area is 
approximately 334 acres. 
5. Water contact mode is diffusive transport. 
6. Two thermal loadings are employed: high-temperature loading and 
ambient-temperature loading. 
7. Mean pH of the groundwater is 7.25. 
8. The rock formation is basaltic rock. 
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of HLRW: 
1. The eleven most Important radionuclides with long half-lives are 
considered. They are: C-14, Se-79, Tc-99,1-129, Cs-135, Ra-226, 
U-234, Np-237, Pu-239, Pu-240, and Pu-242. 
2. The waste-form is spent fuel assemblies from PWR reactors. 
3. The waste package design is a modified MPC design with 1 cm of 
Alloy 825 and surrounded by 10 cm of carbon steel. Each container 
can hold maximum of 9 PWR fuel assemblies. 
4. Ten PWRs are expected to be built on Java over the next 25 years 
beginning in the year 2004. The estimated number of spent fuel 
assemblies produced by these reactors is 7,489 by the year 2036 
(see Table 4.2). The required number of containers will be 
approximately 850. 
5. The dominant degradation mechanism is general corrosion for the 
outer barrier and pitting corrosion for the inner barrier of the MPC. 
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Dose conversion: 
1. The dose conversion table employed in this study is similar to one 
used to by INTERA, Inc. for TSPA of Yucca Mountain project [54]. 
2. The conversion of the impact of the ingestion of contaminated 
drinking water in terms of rem uses a table derived from the GENII 
computer code which is based on International Council on Radiation 
Protection (ICRP 30) standards [55,56]. 
Disruptive event scenario: 
1. Two disruptive events are considered: earthquakes and flooding of 
the repository facility. The data for the annual rate of occurrence for 
each event are taken from the seismic analyses conducted for the 
nearby NPPs selected site [11]. The annual rate of occurrence for 
earthquake is 1x10"  ^and for flooding of the repository is 1 x10'^ . 
The complete listing of the input to the RIP code can be found in Appendix B. 
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5.2. The Analyses of the Results from the RIP Computer Code 
Several radionuclides must receive special consideration in PA analyses due 
to their long half-lives and their high solubilities in groundwater. These 
radionuclides include 0-14, Se-79, Tc-99,1-129, Cs-135, Ra-226, Np-237. The 
early releases of these radionuclides to be considered are C-14, Se-79, Tc-99, and 
Cs-135. The radionuclides that are significant for a long-term releases are Np-237 
and Ra-226. In addition, the total releases of all radionuclides considered in this 
study is also presented. 
Transport of radionuclides in the saturated zone yields retardation of 
radionuclide migration due to sorption and dispersion. During this period of 
retardation, radioactive decay reduces the inventory of most radionuclides. Table 
5.1 shows the calculated mean annual release rate of these radionuclides to the AE. 
From the table, it can be seen that Ra-226 and U-234 have high annual 
release rates compared to other radionuclides. These isotopes do not retard 
significantly in the saturated zone. They have low retardation factors (see Table 
4.5). Ra-226 is the second ingrowth product in the U-234 decay chain. That is U-
234 decays to Th-230 and then Th-230 decays to Ra-226. 
The domination of releases by these radionuclides does not appear at the 
same time. For instance, the isotope C-14 dominates the releases up to 
approximately 30000 years. 
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Table 5.1. The Mean Annual Release Rate (Ci/year) for Various Radionuclides 
Radionuclide AE 
7.35x10® 
Se-79 5.67x10® 
Tc-99 2.70x10"® 
-6 1-129 8.02x10 
Cs-135 1.20x10"  ^
Ra-226 4.61x10'^  
U-234 1.07 
Np-237 1.03x10-  ^
Pu-239 1.86x10"  ^
Pu-240 3.47x10"® 
Pu-242 4.24x10 r4 
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5.2.1. Results of Early Releases to the AE 
To demonstrate the variation of releases to the AE up to 35000 years, 
several radionuclides must be considered. They are C-14 (5715 years), Se-79 
(6.5x10'* years), Tc-99 (2.13x10® years), 1-129 (1.7x10  ^years), and Cs-135 (2.3x10® 
years). 
Figure 5.1 shows the release of C-14 (Ci/yr.) as a function of time. This 
figure suggests that C-14 dominates the early releases up to approximately 20000 
years. Each peak corresponds to the failure of a group of containers. The 
maximum total release rate of C-14 to the AE is 1.16x10'^  Ci/yr. 
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Figure 5.1. Release of C-14 (Ci/yr.) to the AE as a Function of Time 
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A distribution of the release for C-14 in terms of a Complimentary Cumulative 
Distribution Function (CCDF) can be seen in Figure 5.2, which is plotted on a linear-
log scale. The results presented in this figure indicate that the most probable 
cumulative release to the AE is approximately 7.35 Ci. 
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Figure 5.2. CCDF Plot of C-14 for Release to the AE 
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Figure 5.3 shows the release of Se-79 (Ci/yr.) as a function of time. This 
figure suggests that Se-79 is a dominant radionuclide over the time period up to 
approximately 35000 years. The maximum total release rate to the AE is 6.74x10"® 
Ci/yr. The most probable release inventory for Se-79 to the AE is approximately 
5.67 Ci. Figure 5.4 shows the CCDF plot for Se-79. 
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Figure 5.3. Release of Se-79 (Ci/yr.) to the AE as a Function of Time 
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Figure 5.4. CCDF Plot of Se-79 for Releases to the AE 
Figure 5.5 shows the release of Tc-99 (Ci/yr.) as a function of time. This 
figure suggests that Tc-99 is a dominant radionuclide over the time period up to 
approximately 80000 years. The maximum release rate of Tc-99 to the AE is 
2.61x10'^  Ci/yr. The most probable release inventory for Tc-99 to the AE 
approximately 269.27 Ci. Figure 5.6 shows the CCDF plot for Tc-99. 
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Figure 5.5. Release of Tc-99 (Gi/yr.) to the AE as a Function of Time 
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Figure 5.7 shows the release of 1-129 (Ci/yr.) as a function of time. This 
figure suggests that 1-129 is a dominant radionuclide over the time period up to 
approximately 35000 years. The maximum total release rate of 1-129 to the AE is 
7.23x10"  ^Ci/yr. The most probable release inventory for 1-129 to the AE is 
approximately 0.80 Ci. Figure 5.8 shows the CCDF plot for 1-129. 
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Figure 5.7. Release of 1-129 (Ci/yr.) to the AE as a Function of Time 
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lOOO realizations, run uith RIP 3.21 05-22-95 17:35:03 
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Figure 5.8. CCDF Plot of 1-129 for Releases to the AE 
Figure 5.9 shows the release of Cs-135 (Ci/yr.) as a function of time. This 
figure suggests that Cs-135 is a dominant radionuclide over the time period up to 
approximately 35000 years. The maximum total release rate of Cs-135 to the AE is 
1.08x10'^  Ci/yr. The most probable release inventory for Cs-135 to the AE is 
approximately 12.04 Ci. Figure 5.10 shows the CCDF plot for Cs-135. 
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Figure 5.10. CCDF Plot of Cs-135 for Releases to the AE 
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5.2.2. Results of Releases to the AE up to 100000 Years 
Ra-226 (1599 years) and Np-237 (2.14x10® years) dominate tlie long-term 
releases from 1000 years to 100000 years. Np-237 domination occurs since the 
nuclide has a very long half-life and a low retardation factor. 
Figure 5.11 shows the release of Np-237 (Ci/yr.) as a function of time. This 
figure suggests that Np-237 is a potentially significant contributor to the total 
radiological impact over the time period from 1000 year to 100000 years. The 
maximum total release rate of Np-237 to the AE is 1.03x10"  ^Ci/yr. The most 
probable release inventory for Np-237 to the AE is approximately 10.30 Ci. Figure 
5.12 shows the CCDF plot for Np-237. 
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Figure 5.11. Release of Np-237 (Ci/yr.) to the AE as a Function of Time 
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1000 realizations, run uith RIP 3.21 OS-22-95 17:35:03 
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Figure 5.12. CCDF Plot of Np-237 for Releases to the AE 
Figure 5.13 shows the release of Ra-226 (Ci/yr.) as a function of time. The 
maximum total release rate of Ra-226 to the AE is 4.61x10"  ^Ci/yr. The most 
probable release inventory for Ra-226 to the AE is approximately 4.67X10*'' Ci. 
Figure 5.14 shows the CCDF plot for Ra-226. 
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Figure 5.15 shows the total release to the AE of all radionuclides in CCDF 
plot. The figure suggests that the most probable release from the inventories of 
radionuclides to the AE is approximately 2.61X10*® Ci during the time period of 
initial emplacement up to 100000 years later. 
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5.3. Dose/Risk Evaluations 
The PA analyses in terms of close/risl< evaluations is very important. The 
analyses of radiation hazard is very involved for several reasons: interaction of 
radiation and matter, and the relationships of dose and observable effects to 
humans. The basic philosophy for radiation release and effect to humans is 
expressed in the term ALAR A (As low As Reasonably Achievable). 
The evaluation is based on the assumptions that the person lives near the 
repository facility, and uses the contaminated groundwater as the source for 
drinking water. The annual water consumption is assumed to be 730 liters/yr. 
The Dose conversion factors relate dose in millirems (mrem) to the activity of 
each radionuclide in the drinking water in picocuries (pCi). A relatively new concept 
called the Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE) is used in this study. The 
time spans used in this study are taken to be 1 year exposure and 50 year 
exposure. The resulting 1 year dose from a 1 year exposure is called the annual 
effective dose equivalent (AEDE). The resulting 50 year dose from a 1 year 
exposure is called the committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE). The resulting 
50 year dose from a 50 year exposure is called the cumulative committed effective 
dose equivalent (CCEDE). The unit of whole body equivalent doses is rem 
(radiation equivalent men). Table 5.2 shows the dose conversion factor based on 
the calculation using the GENII computer code [54,55,56]. 
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Table 5.2. Dose Conversion Factors (Ingestion - Drinking Water, 
1 |iCi/liters of Groundwater, Dose in rems) [54,55,56] 
Isotope 1 Year Exposure 50 Year Exposure 
1 Year Dose (AEDE) 50 Year Dose (CEDE) 50 Year Dose(CCEDE) 
C-14 1.5 1.5 7.5x10*' 
Se-79 5.2 6.1 3.0x1 O*'' 
Tc-99 1.6 1.6 8.1x10*' 
1-129 1.6x10^^ 1.8x10*^ 9.1x10*^ 
Cs-135 4.5 5.0 2.5x10*'' 
Ra-226 8.0x10^' 7.0x10*^ 2.6x10*^ 
U-234 1.4x10^' 1.9x10*' 8.8x10*'' 
Np-237 1.0x10*'' 3.8x10*=^ 1.0x10*" 
Pu-239 1.3x10"^' 3.6x10*' 1.3x10*^ 
Pu-240 1.3x10*' 3.6x10*' 1.3x10*' 
PU-242 1.2x10*' 3.4x10*' 1.2x10*'' 
As an illustration, let us calculate the dose resulting from a release of C-14 In 
radioactive groundwater in the repository facility. As shown in Table 5.1, the mean 
release of C-14 to the AE is 7.35x10'® Cl/yr. The average flow rate of the 
groundwater pathway of Genting Island Is approximately 315.58 m®/yr (see 
Appendix B). Therefore, the concentration of C-14 is 
(7.35x10  ^|iCi/yr.) / (315.58x10® liters/yr.) = 2.33x10"  ^ jiCi/liters 
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To determine the total body dose using AEDE and make use of Table 5.2, 
the result of the product factor is 
(2.33x10"  ^|j,Ci/liters) x (1.5 rems/(|j,Ci/Hters)) = 3.5x10"  ^rems (0.35 mrems). 
The same result is obtained for the CEDE case since the Dose conversion 
factor is the same. For the CCEDE case, the total body dose is 1.75x10"  ^rems 
(17.5 mrems). 
The results of the total body dose calculation for the isotopes in Table 5.2 can 
be seen in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3. Total Body Dose Calculations (No Dilution Factor) 
isotope AEDE (rems) CEDE (rems) CCEDE (rems) 
C-14 3.5x10-^ 3.5x10^ 1.8x10'' 
Se-79 9.3x10"* 1.1x10-^ 5.4x10-^ 
Tc-99 1.4x10^ 1.4x10'^ 6.9x10' 
1-129 4.1x10^ 4.6x10=" 2.3x10' 
Cs-135 1.7x10=^ 1.9x10'' 9.5x10-^ 
Ra-226 1.2x10^^ 1.0x10*^ 3.8x10^ 
U-234 4.7x10^' 6.4x10^' 3.0x10"' 
Np-237 3.3x10^ 1.2 3.3x10"' 
Pu-239 7.6x10' 2.1 7.6x10"' 
Pu-240 1.4x10'^ 4.0x10'' 1.4x10"' 
Pu-242 1.6x10^^ 4.6x10'' 1.6 
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From the table, It can be seen that the actlnides have a significant 
radiological impact to humans when a person lives within the exclusion zone. 
These results are as anticipated. The seawater dilution factor, however, is not 
incorporated in the calculations. 
The assumption employed in this model for determining the dilution factor is 
that the exclusion zone is 1 km. The depth of sea surrounding the island is 
approximately 20 m, as shown in Figure 5.16. 
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Figure 5.16. Exclusion Zone 
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Using a cylindrical model to determine the seawater volume and assume that 
only one third of the volume occupied by water, the calculation suggests 
Volume = TC X (1,000)  ^x 20 x 0.3 = 2.1 x 10  ^m® 
Dilution factor = 315.58 m® / 2.1 x 10  ^m®= 1.5 x 10*® 
Table 5.4 shows the result of calculations when the seawater dilution factor is 
incorporated. The existence of ocean clearly has significant impact in reducing the 
concentration of each radionuclide in the perimeter of the exclusion zone used in 
this study. It should be noted that these dose rates are calculated assuming direct 
consumption of drinking water. Seawater will not be employed as a drinking water 
source. Additional pathway analyses (seafood and biota) should be employed in 
subsequent PA analyses using these diluted radionuclide concentrations. 
It is shown from the table that the concentration of each isotope Is 
significantly reduced. The chemistry of the seawater may also effect the solubility of 
the actinides. In addition, geological isolation is ensured by the remote nature of the 
site and the regional environment. 
This study has been undertaken in a conservative manner. However, the 
study expects to see some potential impacts to the AE when the repository is 
flooded and/or earthquakes occur. 
92 
Table 5.4. Total Body Dose Calculations (With Dilution Factor) 
Isotope AEDE (rems) CEDE (rems) CCEDE (rems) 
C-14 5.3x10'^  5.3x10"® 2.6x10"' 
Se-79 1.4x10"  ^ 1.7x10-" 8.1x10"' 
Tc-99 2.1x10"' 2.1x10"  ^ 1.0x10-  ^
1-129 6.2x10*" 6.9x10-" 3.5x10"® 
Cs-135 2.6x10-" 2.9x10"" 1.4x10  ^
Ra-226 I.SxIO"" 1.5x10"  ^ 5.7x10"  ^
U-234 7.1x10-  ^ 9.7x10"  ^ 4.5x10"  ^
Np-237 4.9x10"' 1.9x10"  ^ 4.9x10"  ^
Pu-239 1.2x10'' 3.2x10"  ^ 1.2x10-® 
Pu-240 2.2x10"" 6.0x10"® 2.2x10  ^
Pu-242 2.4x10"' 6.9x10"' 2.2x10"  ^
As required by law, the exclusion zone is set at 5 km. However, in this study 
only 1 km exclusion zone is employed. This exclusion zone was deemed adequate 
to ensure that no biotic transport mechanism was operable except possible 
transport to marine life via releases to the ocean environment. Such release would 
entail significant dilution effect and are deemed insignificant. However, subsequent 
analyses which consider bioaccumulation effects should be completed. 
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5.4. Critical Data 
The PA analyses at this stage has been completed to provide preliminary 
estimates of repository performance. These analyses are necessary to provide 
input to the site-characterization and repository-design programs. This current 
work, however, should be considered as a preliminary developmental process. The 
results from this study can be used to assess the critical parameters/data that will 
contribute to better and more sensitive assessment of the proposed repository site 
in the future. The critical data are described and discussed in the following section. 
5.4.1. Waste Package Design 
The waste package that should be employed for the HLRW in this repository 
facility is a modified MPC or MESC design. These designs could provide more 
advantages for the ocean-island type of repository facility. For instance, the 
handling procedures are significantly less when compared to other designs. The 
design will limit radiological exposure of the workers handling the wastes, and it will 
enhance the ease in transportation. The ocean-island repository requires two types 
of transportation: land and sea. 
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The number of waste packages will not be excessive, so a small MPC design 
that can hold 9 PWR assemblies should be further considered. 
The materials to be used for the container are subject to further investigation. 
Tropical areas requires materials that have low material corrosion rates. In addition, 
microorganisms may have a significant Impact on container degradation. In this 
area, microorganisms can survive and exist deep underground in large quantity. 
Therefore, investigating corrosion rates that may include contributions from 
microorganisms should be conducted thoroughly. As a starting point, relevant 
information can be gathered from the underground oil-pipeline data available for 
tropical areas. 
5.4.2. Radionuclide Inventory 
The radionuclide inventory employed in this study is a representation of the 
isotopes that have long-term impact to the environment. Based on the results 
presented in the previous sections, it is important to conduct more detailed analyses 
of the impacts of Np-237, and other actinides in the AE. 
The decay processes of radionuclides are predictable, although the burnup of 
spent nuclear fuel is unknown. The inventory of each isotope depends upon the 
decay of the parent isotopes, which vary with the burnup. Hence, total burnup will 
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affect all the isotopes in the decay chain. Relatively accurate data regarding burnup 
is necessary for more detailed analyses. 
5.4.3. Geological Characteristics 
The most important parameters regarding geological properties of the ocean-
island repository facility are the matrix, bulk, and fracture properties. The matrix 
properties include porosity of the rock, rock bulk density, saturated hydraulic 
conductivity, water-retention parameters, and residual degree of saturation. 
The bulk properties include bulk saturated hydraulic conductivity, gas 
permeability, and combination of bulk and gas saturated hydraulic conductivities. 
The fracture properties for flow and transport models include frequency of 
fracture, orientation, spacing, hydraulic aperture, and porosity. 
In addition that the earthquake plays an important role in the repository 
integrity. When the rate of occurrence was selected to be 1x10'^  no effects shown 
in the results. But, when the rate of occurrence was taken to be 1x10'^  some 
significant effects were seen. Therefore, further study regarding seismic analyses 
of the site must be thoroughly conducted. 
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5.4.4. Pathway Parameters 
For an ocean-island repository and sited below the groundwater table, the 
most important pathway for radionuclide releases is through the groundwater since 
the groundwater is usually shallow. 
The radionuclides releases through the rock will eventually reach the 
groundwater. In the groundwater, the radionuclides will travel in a diffusive manner 
to the AE. Therefore, the groundwater is expected to be the primary agents 
affecting the performance of the Genting Island repository. In addition to being the 
transport mechanism for the radionuclides, the groundwater will also corrode the 
waste containers. Hence, understanding groundwater flow characteristics is 
essential when attempting to predict repository performance. 
The shallow groundwater is assumed to exist under in reducing conditions. 
Consequently, the next assumption is to consider solubility under reducing 
conditions only rather than oxidizing conditions. 
In regard to gaseous flow and transport, this study suggests that C-14 will not 
be released in significant quantity. However, a more accurate analyses should be 
conducted. The gas flows are driven by heat and in turn affect waste package 
temperatures. A coupled transient model of heat transfer and gas flow employing a 
relatively fine grid will be required. 
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The ocean dilution factor plays a very important role in reducing the 
concentration of radionuclides releases to the AE. Their concentrations become 
essentially negligible when this factor is incorporated in the analyses. Therefore, 
employing a more accurate model to calculate the dilution factor is necessary. 
Seafood and biota should be analyzed as the potential transport pathways in 
the future study. 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1. Summary and Conclusion of the Study 
The TSPA of the proposed HLRW repository facility at Genting Island, 
Karimunjawa archipelago, Indonesia has been completed. The emphasis of this 
study has been to determine the parameters required and developing the 
methodology for completing a preliminary PA evaluation. The emphasis of the 
analysis is the evaluation of releases of radionuclides to the AE. 
The parameters pertinent to the repository site include information from 
geology, climatology, and water chemistry perspectives. These data are important 
to predict the long-term performance of the site. Two disruptive events scenarios 
were incorporated: earthquakes, and flooding the repository site. 
The development of the methodology to conduct the analyses can be 
categorized into three main areas: the inventory of HLRW, the natural and 
engineered barrier systems, and the geology of the site. The inventory of 
radionuclides employed in this study includes the isotopes that have long half-lives 
with a range of retardation factors. The waste-form considered in this study is spent 
nuclear fuel assemblies of the PWR type. 
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The natural barrier systems include basaltic rock, clay and soil as backfill 
materials. Basaltic rock possesses high compression strength. 
The engineered barrier systems includes a modified MPC design with 1 cm of 
Alloy 825 and surrounded by 10 cm of carbon steel. This container can hold 
maximum of 9 PWR fuel assemblies. 
Gaseous releases from C-14 is important only during the first 30000 years, 
since the half-life is sufficiently short. The fast release of this nuclide is primarily 
due to faster transport time. The release of ^^COz will most likely have a 
negligible radiological impact on the environment. The total inventory in the 
proposed repository is less than the allowed release of from an operating 
NPP. 
Other radionuclides that have long half-lives and/or low retardation factors 
resulted in rather higher releases, especially Tc-99, Np-237, and other actinides. 
Eventhough Ra-226 has a relatively short half-life, this radionuclide appeared as in­
growth product of U-234. It appeared after 20000 years. 
The rate of occurrence of earthquakes in this study was taken to be 1x10'^ , 
Using this number, the effect of the earthquakes on the performance of the 
repository was not shown. However, some significant effects were shown when the 
rate of occurrence of earthquakes was set at 1x10'^ . Further analyses of the impact 
of earthquakes on repository design and performance are required. 
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The Dose Conversion Factors provided by the GENII computer code, 
SANDIA Report, and INTERA Report of the Yucca Mountain Project show 
compatibilities (See Appendix A). The calculation shows that for a person living in 
the vicinity for 50 years and Ingesting Ra-226 through contaminated drinking water 
for 50 years, the CCEDE is 2.6x10"* rems. However, when the person lives in the 
perimeter of the exclusion zone, the CCEDE from Ra-226 ingestion is only 
approximately 5.7x10'^  rems. 
In general, all the actinides show rather high dose in this study. One of the 
most important factors to study further is the behavior of Np-237 and its impact on 
the AE. This radionuclide lasts in the inventory for a very long period of time. 
The materials properties for the containers used in this study were taken from 
the research elsewhere. Therefore, it is necessary to gather data that are more 
closely represent Genting Island repository. 
The behavior of groundwater requires further analyses. This is one of the 
most important pathways for the release of radionuclides from the repository facility. 
in order to ensure public safety, an exclusion zone of up to 5 km can be 
established. This can be maintained over an extended period of time to ensure 
public health. 
This study has shown that the ocean-island repository concept can be used 
as a repository facility for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Indonesia. The area 
is considered wet environment. 
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One topic of investigation that has not been dealt with in this study is the 
economic impact. The cost of containers and transportation, for example, could be 
quite high. Also, when dealing with the wastes, several government institutions will 
be involved in decision making process. 
6.2. Suggestions for Future TSPA Work 
Significant additional work remains to be done on TSPA of the proposed 
HLRW repository site at Genting Island. Many important features, processes, and 
events have to be included in subsequent models. 
Additional gaseous flow and transport calculations needs to be conducted in 
greater detail. Especially, variation C-14 transport time with variations in 
permeability of the different layers. 
The geostatistical modeling of stratigraphy should be refined. Additional 
geostatistical modeling for other properties should also be conducted. For instance, 
finding the uncertainty in saturated-zone velocity will be important. The effects of 
matrix/fracture coupling in the saturated zone must also be investigated. 
The kinetics of dissolution of UO2 and other materials in seawater, and 
groundwater from the Genting Island should be investigated. 
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Materials selections for containers that are suitable for tropical climates 
should be further investigated. In addition, the microbiological-influenced corrosion 
rates should be included in further studies. 
Seismic analyses for the island should be conducted in order to determine 
more accurate rates of occurrence of earthquakes surrounding the repository area. 
Such analyses will provide more accurate input parameters for the evaluation of the 
potential effects of earthquakes on TSPA of the proposed repository at Genting 
Island, Karimunjawa, Indonesia. 
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APPENDIX A. DOSE CONVERSION FACTORS 
Total-body dose-conversion factors for ingestion 
SANDIA (P. 14-4, V. 2) 
Species Dose-Conversion Factor (mrem/Ci) 
Pu-239 4.3x10® 
Np-237 3.9x10® 
U-234 2.6x10® 
Pa-231 1.1x10^° 
1-129 2.8x10® 
Tc-99 1.3x10® 
Se-79 8.3x10® 
Assumptions: 
1. Tlie water is consumed at a rate of 2 liters per day (730 liters/year) 
2. No mixing or dilution for the well-withdrawal process 
3. 5 km exclusion zone 
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APPENDIX B. LIST OF INPUTS TO THE RIP COMPUTER CODE 
The title of the data file is 
TSPA of Genting Island, Rev. 10.4a 
The file was last written on 05-22-95 at 17:35:03 
The name of the data file is GENT4A.RP 
This file is organized as follows: 
"GENERAL INFORMATION* 
*OUTPUT* 
"SIMULATION DETAILS* 
*RN TABLE* 
"WASTE PACKAGE DESCRIPTION* 
"NEAR FIELD CONDITIONS* 
"PATHWAY DESCRIPTIONS* 
"RECEPTOR DESCRIPTIONS* 
*DOSE CONVERSION TABLES* 
"DISRUPTIVE EVENTS" 
"STRATEGY* 
"PARAMETER DATABASE* 
"GENERAL INFORMATION" 
The name of the RN species table is genrell .dat 
The number of defined paths is 1 
The paths are : PATH1 
The number of defined receptors is 2 
The receptors are: KIDS,ADULTS 
The number of defined dose conversion tables is 1 
The dose conversion tables are: TABLE1 
The number of defined waste packages is 1 
The WPs are: SPENT 
The number of disruptive events is 2 
The Events are : FLOOD,QUAKES 
The Radionuclide Groups are: 
Group 1 C14,CS135,I129,NP237,PU239,PU240,PU242 
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RA226,SE79,TC99.U234,U235,U238,U233,U236 
PB210,TH230,PA231 .TH229,TH232,AC227.RA228,TH228 
*OUTPUT* 
Output flags 
a A b B c C d D e E f F g G j J m  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0  
Description of output flags used 
Release from WPs by WP group and RN 
Release from WPs by WP group 
Release from all WPs by RN 
Release from ail WPs grand total 
Release to the AE by path and RN 
Release to the AE by path 
Total release to the AE by RN 
Total release to the AE 
Release totals by path and RN 
Release totals by path 
Max release time histories saved for RN output 
Max release time histories saved for totals 
Maximum annual normalized release 
Normalized total release to AE 
Results are not being normalized 
The WP model is being run 
*SIMULATION DETAILS* 
The number of timesteps used is 100 
The number of years per timestep is 1000 
The total number of realizations is 1000 
Random results are being generated 
Latin-Hypercube sampling is turned on 
There are 1 event classes defined 
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For this class, 1 out of 1 realizations is l^ ept 
The realizations with the following events are in this class : 
All other realizations 
*RN TABLE* 
RN ID Decay Regulatory Activity Daughter Rate Limit 
C14 
CS135 
1129 
NP237 
PU239 
PU240 
PU242 
RA226 
SE79 
TC99 
U234 
U235 
U238 
U233 
U236 
PB210 
TH230 
PA231 
TH229 
TH232 
AC227 
RA228 
TH228 
1.209E-04 
3.013E-07 
4.414E-08 
3.238E-07 
2.879E-05 
1.060E-04 
1.791E-06 
4.331 E-04 
1.067E-05 
3.254E-06 
2.834E-06 
9.845E-01 
1.551 E-01 
4.372E-06 
2.959E-08 
3.108E-02 
8.999E-06 
2.115E-05 
9.441 E-05 
4.932E-11 
3.183E-02 
1.205E-01 
3.622E-01 
1.0E-01 
1.0E+00 
1.0E-01 
1.0E-01 
1.0E-01 
1.0E-01 
1.0E-01 
1.0E-01 
1.0E+00 
1.0E+01 
1.0E-01 
1.0E-01 
1.0E-01 
1.0E-01 
1.0E-01 
1.0E+00 
1.0E-02 
1.0E-01 
1.0E-01 
1.0E-02 
2.0E-01 
2.0E-01 
2.0E-01 
1.48E+00 
5.57E-01 
3.72E-02 
4.87E-01 
3.75E+02 
5.73E+02 
2.18E+00 
2.64E-06 
4.80E-01 
1.51E+01 
1.43E+00 
1.68E-02 
3.14E-01 
7.82E-05 
2.93E-01 
7.51 E-07 
3.79E-04 
3.59E-05 
4.32E-07 
4.71 E-10 
1.97E-05 
3.36E-10 
O.OOE+00 
U233 
U235 
U236 
U238 
PB210 
TH230 
PA231 
U234 
TH229 
TH232 
RA226 
AC227 
RA228 
TH228 
*WASTE PACKAGE DESCRIPTION" 
Details of Waste Package 1 
ID : SPENT 
Description : 
Numpackages : 
MTHM per pack 
MWD per MTHM 
7489 SFA from PWR, 9 assemblies per package 
8.3E+0002 
1.34000E+01 
: 3.30000E+04 
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Repository Infiltration Rate (m/yr) : FLOW 
Air Alteration Rate (1/yr) :AAR 
Matrix dissolution Rate (g/m*m/yr) : DISS 
Surface area of Matrix (m*m/g): 1.00000E-01 
Water volume contacting Matrix (m*m*m): 1 .OOOOOE-01 
Mass of Sorbent (kg); O.OOOOOE+00 
Equilibrium Partition Coefficient for RN group 1 : 1 .OOOOOE-01 
Container failure modes for the Waste Package 1 
Container failure mode 1 
general corrosion 
Start when rewet 
Aging rate of Failure mode: O.OOOOOE+00 
Probability Failure mode is active: FAIL 
Weibull Failure Mode 
Alpha : 2.00000E+00 
Beta - Epsilon : 5.00000E+03 
Effective Catchment Area (m*m): CATCH 
Geometric factor for diffusion (m): 1 .OOOOOE-02 
Fraction of fuel which is wetted is 1 .OOOOOE-01 
Cladding failure modes for the Waste Package 1 
Cladding failure mode 1 
creep rupture of cladding 
Start when container fails 
Probability Failure mode is active: FAIL2 
Weibull Failure Mode 
Alpha : 1.50000E+00 
Beta - Epsilon : 1 .OOOOOE+04 
Behavior of RNs in Waste Package 1 
RN C14 
Inventory (Ci/container): 3.11000E+00 
Free Mass Balance: FREE1 
Gap Mass Balance : GAPS 
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This RN Is in ciiemical group 1 
This RN is gaseous 
Gaseous mass transfer rate away from WP (g/yr): C14MTR 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1 .OOOOOE+01 
Elemental solubility {g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1: PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN CS135 
Inventory (Ci/container): 1.19000E+00 
Free Mass Balance: 1.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0300 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1 .OOOOOE+02 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN 1129 
Inventory (Ci/container): 7.81000E-02 
Free Mass Balance: 1.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0300 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1,00000E+02 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN NP237 
Inventory (Ci/container): 1.02000E+00 
Free Mass Balance: 0.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0300 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1 .OOOOOE+02 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): 3,60000E+01 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN PU239 
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Inventory (Ci/container): 7.88000E+02 
Free Mass Balance : 0.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1.00000E+01 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m); 2.10000E-03 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN PU240 
Inventory (Cl/container): 1.20000E+03 
Free Mass Balance: 0.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1 .OOOOOE+01 
Elemental solubility (g/m*nn*m): 2.10000E-03 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN PU242 
Inventory (Ci/container): 4.58000E+00 
Free Mass Balance: 0.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1 .OOOOOE+01 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m); 2.10000E-03 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN RA226 
Inventory (Ci/container): 5.54000E-06 
Free Mass Balance : 1.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1 .OOOOOE+02 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
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Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN SE79 
Inventory (Ci/container): 1.01000E+00 
Free Mass Balance : 1.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1.00000E+02 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN TC99 
Inventory (Ci/container): 3.17000E+01 
Free Mass Balance: 1.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN Is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr); 1 .OOOOOE+02 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN U234 
Inventory (Ci/container): 3.00000E+00 
Free Mass Balance: 0.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1.00000E+01 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m); SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN U235 
Inventory (Ci/container); 3.53000E-02 
Free Mass Balance: 0.0000 
Gap Mass Balance ; 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
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Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1 .OOOOOE+01 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN U238 
Inventory (Ci/container): 6.59000E-01 
Free Mass Balance: 0.0000 
Gap Mass Balance ; 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1.00000E+01 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN U233 
Inventory (Ci/container): 1.64000E-04 
Free Mass Balance; 0.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1 .OOOOOE+01 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN U236 
Inventory (Ci/container): 6.15000E-01 
Free Mass Balance : 0.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1 .OOOOOE+01 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN PB210 
Inventory (Ci/container): 1.50000E-06 
Free Mass Balance: 0.0000 
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Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1 .OOOOOE+01 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN TH230 
Inventory (Ci/container): 7.96000E-04 
Free Mass Balance; 0.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1 .OOOOOE+01 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN PA231 
Inventory (Ci/container); 7.54000E-05 
Free Mass Balance: 0.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr); 1 .OOOOOE+01 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN TH229 
Inventory (Ci/container): 9.07000E-07 
Free Mass Balance ; 0.0000 
Gap Mass Balance ; 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1 .OOOOOE+01 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN TH232 
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Inventory (Ci/container): 9.89000E-10 
Free Mass Balance: 0.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1.00000E+01 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN AC227 
Inventory (Ci/container): 4.14000E-05 
Free Mass Balance: 0.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1 .OOOOOE+01 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN RA228 
Inventory (Ci/container): 7.06000E-10 
Free Mass Balance : 1.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1 .OOOOOE+02 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
RN TH228 
Inventory (Ci/container): 9.07000E-07 
Free Mass Balance : 0.0000 
Gap Mass Balance : 0.0000 
This RN is in chemical group 1 
This RN is not gaseous 
Effective diffusion coefficient (m*m/yr): 1 .OOOOOE+01 
Elemental solubility (g/m*m*m): SOL 
The number of release paths is 1 
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Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
*NEAR-FIELD CONDITIONS* 
WP groups as defined by the environmental conditions 
Expected 
Group# #WPs WPTYPE CONTAC TEMPV PH 
1 68 1 1 0.6650 0.6650 
2 68 1 1 0.6650 0.9950 
3 70 1 1 0.6650 1.3300 
4 68 1 1 0.9950 0.6650 
5 68 1 1 0.9950 0.9950 
6 70 1 1 0.9950 1.3300 
7 70 1 1 1.3300 0.6650 
8 70 1 1 1.3300 0.9950 
9 72 1 1 1.3300 1.3300 
10 23 1 2 0.6650 0.6650 
11 23 1 2 0.6650 0.9950 
12 23 1 2 0.6650 1.3300 
13 23 1 2 0.9950 0.6650 
14 23 1 2 0.9950 0.9950 
15 23 1 2 0.9950 1.3300 
16 23 1 2 1.3300 0.6650 
17 23 1 2 1.3300 0.9950 
18 24 1 2 1.3300 1.3300 
CONTAC % Balance Description 
1 0.750 diffusive tr 
2 1.000 advective tr 
The repository rewetting temperature is 1 .OOOOOE+02 
Its variability of 0.500 is Uniform 
The discretization levels are 0.330 0.660 1.000 
The temperature time history for the repository is: 
Time (yrs) Temperature 
0.0 35.00 
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1.0 80.00 
10.0 125.00 
100.0 185.00 
1000.0 160.00 
10000.0 85.00 
The variability in the temperature is TEMPA 
The variability in the time is TIMEA 
The incremental temperature time history for WP SPENT is : 
Time (yrs) Temperature 
0.0 25.00 
1.0 30.00 
10.0 50.00 
100.0 70.00 
1000.0 60.00 
10000.0 40.00 
The variability in the temperature is TEDGE 
There are 1 other environmental factors 
Environmental factor 1 has a value of MEANPH 
Its variability of 0.500 is Uniform 
The discretization levels are 0.330 0.660 1.000 
^PATHWAY DESCRIPTION* 
The tolerance vs 
Fraction of total 
Mode velocity 
Mode porosity 
Pathway length 
Transition rate 
s for recalculating are : 
v: 1.00000E-01 
: 1.00000E-01 
: 1.00000E-01 
; 1.00000E-01 
: 1.00000E-01 
Specified flow balance 
Path ID Total Flow Discharge (fraction) 
PATH1 3.15580E+02 PATH1 (1.000) 
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Details of Path 1 
ID : PATH1 
Description: geosphere pathways 
ID for dose/conc. conversion table : 
Totallength of Pathway (m) : 1.00000E+03 
Total Area of Pathway (m*m) : 5.76000E+02 
Total Flow through Pathway (m*m*m/yr): 3.15580E+02 
The number of exit paths is 1 
Path 1 : PATH1 Fraction of Balance = 1.0000 
The number of flow modes is 2 
Flow mode #1 
Description: matrix flow 
Fraction of balance of remaining total flow: FLOW 
Flow mode velocity : VEL 
Transition rate (m): POISON 
The number of retardation factors is 1 
RN group 1 Sorption SORP Matrix diffusion : MAT 
Flow mode #2 
Description: fracture flow 
Fraction of balance of remaining total flow: 1.0000 
Flow mode porosity : 1 .OOOOOE-01 
Transition rate (m): N/A 
The number of retardation factors is 1 
RN group 1 Sorption 10.0000 Matrix diffusion : 20.0000 
PRECEPTOR DESCRIPTIONS* 
Details of receptor 1 
Receptor ID: KIDS 
Description : children under 10 
Risk/Dose ratio : 1 .OOOOOE+00 
Details of receptor 2 
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Receptor ID; ADULTS 
Description : man and woman 
Risk/Dose ratio : 5.00000E-01 
*DOSE CONVERSION TABLES* 
Details of dose table 1 
Table ID : TABLE1 
Description : dose/concentration table 1 
Risk dose values for receptor KIDS 
RNID Value 
014 1.72000E+06 
CS135 1.23000E+03 
1129 2.05000E+02 
NP237 1.31000E+05 
PU239 1.24000E+04 
PU240 4.56000E+04 
PU242 7.25000E+02 
RA226 8.79000E+06 
SE79 1.10000E+05 
TC99 7.72000E+02 
U234 4.56000E+02 
U235 1.48000E-01 
U238 3.63000E-02 
U233 1.36000E+03 
U236 4.48000E+00 
PB210 2.17000E+09 
TH230 6.00000E+03 
PA231 1.12000E+06 
TH229 4.38000E+05 
TH232 1.62000E-01 
AC227 2.28000E+09 
RA228 O.OOOOOE+00 
TH228 O.OOOOOE+00 
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Risk dose values for receptor ADULTS 
RNID Value 
CI 4 1.72000E+06 
CS135 1.23000E+03 
1129 2.05000E+02 
NP237 1.31000E+05 
PU239 1.24000E+04 
PU240 4.56000E+04 
PU242 7.25000E+02 
RA226 8.79000E+06 
SE79 1.10000E+05 
TC99 7.72000E+02 
U234 4.56000E+02 
U235 1.48000E-01 
U238 3.63000E-02 
U233 1.36000E+03 
U236 4.48000E+00 
PB210 2.17000E+09 
TH230 6.00000E+03 
PA231 1.12000E+06 
TH229 4.38000E+05 
TH232 1.62000E-01 
AC227 2.28000E+09 
RA228 O.OOOOOE+00 
TK228 O.OOOOOE+00 
-DISRUPTIVE EVENTS* 
Details of disruptive event 1 
Parameter ID; FLOOD 
Description : Flooding the repository site facility 
Annual rate of occurence : 1 .OOOOOE-05 
Event can reoccur 
The number of descriptors is 1 
Parameter defining descriptor: FLOODS 
Description: 
Consequences: 
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# WPs event moved to AE: 0.0000 
# WPs disrupted by event: 90.0000 
There are 9.0000 WPs moved to PATH1 
1.0000 % of mass is moved from PATH1 to AE 
The number of parameters modified is 0 
Details of disruptive event 2 
Parameter ID: QUAKES 
Description : earthqual<e event affecting the repository 
Annual rate of occurence: 1 .OOOOOE-07 
Event can reoccur 
The number of descriptors is 1 
Parameter defining descriptor: QUAKE 
Description : earthquake disruption of repository 
Consequences: 
# WPs event moved to AE : 0.0000 
# WPs disrupted by event: 90.0000 
There are 9.0000 WPs moved to PATH1 
1.0000 % of mass is moved from PATH1 to AE 
The number of parameters modified is 0 
^STRATEGY* 
Element ID 
Element Description: 
The element is active 
This element starts at 0.00 
The cost of the element is UNDEF 
The element tal<es UNDEF years to complete 
There are 0 precedent elements 
This element modifies 0 parameters 
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*PARAMETER DATABASE* 
Parameter No. 1 of 26 
Parameter ID: AAR 
Description : air alteration rate 
Save Time History: TRUE 
Tlie parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias : Low Bias 
Normal: Mean = 1 .OOOOOE-03 S.D. = 1 .OOOOOE-04 
Parameter No. 2 of 26 
Parameter ID: C14MTR 
Description : c14 mass transfer rate 
Save Time History; TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias : Low Bias 
Normal: Mean = 1.00000E+10 S.D. = 1.00000E-01 
Parameter No. 3 of 26 
Parameter ID: CATCH 
Description : effective catchment area 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias: Low Bias 
Normal: Mean = 5.76000E+02 S.D. = 1.00000E-02 
Parameter No. 4 of 26 
Parameter ID: DISP 
Description : dispersivity 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias : No Bias 
Normal: Mean = 1.00000E+02 S.D. = 1.00000E-02 
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Parameter No. 5 of 26 
Parameter ID: DISS 
Description : matrix dissolution rate 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias ; Low Bias 
Normal: Mean = 5.00000E+00 S.D. = 1.00000E-01 
Parameter No. 6 of 26 
Parameter ID: E 
Description : The natural number E 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is a constant: 2.71828E+00 
Parameter No. 7 of 26 
Parameter ID: EVENT1 
Description : earthquake 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is an Event 
The annual probability of the event: 1 .OOOOOE-07 
The event can reoccur 
Parameter No. 8 of 26 
Parameter ID: FAIL 
Description : failure of containers due general corrosion 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias : Low Bias 
Normal: Mean = 7.50000E-01 S.D. = 1.00000E-03 
Parameter No. 9 of 26 
Parameter ID: FA1L2 
Description : failure due to creep-corrosion 
Save Time History: TRUE 
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The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias: Low Bias 
Normal; Mean = 7.50000E-01 S.D. = 1.00000E-03 
Parameter No. 10 of 26 
Parameter ID: FLOOD 
Description : Flooding the repository site facility 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is an Event 
The annual probability of the event: 1 .OOOOOE-05 
The event can reoccur 
Parameter No. 11 of 26 
Parameter ID: FLOODS 
Description : 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias: No Bias 
Normal: Mean = 1.00000E-05 S.D. = 1.00000E-04 
Parameter No. 12 of 26 
Parameter ID: FLOW 
Description : Repository flow rate 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias: Low Bias 
Normal: Mean = 7.50000E-01 S.D. = 1.00000E-03 
Parameter No. 13 of 26 
Parameter ID: FREE1 
Description : free fraction 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
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Sampling bias; Low Bias 
Normal: Mean = 5.00000E-01 S.D. = 1.00000E-03 
Parameter No. 14 of 26 
Parameter ID: GAPS 
Description : gaps fraction 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias : Low Bias 
Normal: Mean = 1.25000E-02 S.D. = 1.00000E-03 
Parameter No. 15 of 26 
Parameter ID: MAT 
Description : retardation for matrix 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias : No Bias 
Normal: Mean = 5.00000E+03 S.D. = 1 .OOOOOE-04 
Parameter No. 16 of 26 
Parameter ID: MEANPH 
Description : mean pH of the repository 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is a constant: 7.25000E+00 
Parameter No. 17 of 26 
Parameter ID: PI 
Description : The value of PI 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is a constant: 3.14159E+00 
Parameter No. 18 of 26 
Parameter ID: POISON 
Description : poisson transition rate 
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Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias : No Bias 
Normal: Mean = 3.10000E-01 S.D. = 1.00000E-03 
Parameter No. 19 of 26 
Parameter ID: QUAKE 
Description ; earthquake disruption of repository 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias : No Bias 
Normal: Mean = 1.00000E-05 S.D. = 1.00000E-05 
Parameter No. 20 of 26 
Parameter ID: QUAKES 
Description : earthquake event affecting the repository 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is an Event 
The annual probability of the event: 1 .OOOOOE-05 
The event can reoccur 
Parameter No. 21 of 26 
Parameter ID: SOL 
Description : element solubility 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias : No Bias 
Normal: Mean = 1.00000E-02 S.D. = 1.00000E-04 
Parameter No. 22 of 26 
Parameter ID: SORP 
Description ; retardation for sorption 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
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The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias: No Bias 
Normal: Mean = 1.00000E+02 S.D. = 1.00000E-03 
Parameter No. 23 of 26 
Parameter ID: TEDGE 
Description : uncertainty in edge temperature 
Save Time History; TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias : No Bias 
Normal: Mean = 5.00000E+01 S.D. = 1 .OOOOOE-02 
Parameter No. 24 of 26 
Parameter ID: TEMPA 
Description : temperature uncertainty 
Save Time History; TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias : No Bias 
Normal: Mean = 9.00000E+01 S.D. = 1.00000E-02 
Parameter No. 25 of 26 
Parameter ID: TIMEA 
Description : time uncertainty 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
Sampling bias : No Bias 
Normal: Mean = 5.00000E+01 S.D. = 1.00000E-02 
Parameter No. 26 of 26 
Parameter ID: VEL 
Description : input velocity 
Save Time History: TRUE 
The parameter is stochastic 
The distribution is linear 
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Sampling bias : No Bias 
Normal: Mean = 1.00000E+02 S.D. = 1.00000E-02 
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APPENDIX C. DESCRIPTION OF MODEL/PARAMETERS DEVELOPMENT 
AND ASSUMPTIONS/LIMITATIONS 
Genting Island repository facility model includes three different categories: 
waste package, pathways, and disruptive event scenarios. The waste package 
encompasses near-field conditions, and the waste package description. Pathways 
include groundwater parameters as the primary pathway in this model. The 
disruptive event scenarios include earthquakes and flooding the repository. 
The near-field conditions include water contact mode, and temperature 
conditions. The diffusive transport mode is the only mode used in the water contact 
mode category. Temperature conditions require two types of temperatures: 
Repository mean temperature, and Incremental temperature at the edge of the 
waste package. In this case, these two inputs have been translated into high-
temperature thermal loading, and ambient-temperature thermal loading regimes. 
Table C.1 shows these incremental temperatures. Temperature variability is 
assumed to be uniform with the symmetric variability about one being 0.5. The 
rewetting temperature is 100°C. 
Waste package parameters include the number of waste packages (832), the 
MTHM per package (13.4), and the assumed waste bumup (33,000 MWd/MTHM). 
The mass transfer/bound exposure parameter is not independent of failure mode. 
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The mass transfer description in this study includes a repository flow rate is 0.75 
m/yr and a water volume contacting matrix of 0.1 m®. In the exposure category, the 
air alteration rate is assumed to be 0.001/year. The matrix dissolution rate is 
assumed to be 5 g/m /^yr and the surface area of matrix is 0.1 m /^g. 
The primary container failure mode is assumed to be general corrosion with 
the probability of failure of 0.75. The failure distribution type is the Weibull 
distribution. The secondary container failure mode is creep rupture of cladding. 
This failure distribution type is also Weibull. 
Table C.1. Repository Mean and Edge Temperature of Waste Packages 
Repository Mean Temperature Incremental Temperature at edge of WP 
Time (Years) Temperature (°C) Time (Years) Temperature (°C) 
0 35 0 25 
1 80 1 30 
10 125 10 50 
100 135 100 70 
1000 160 1000 60 
10000 85 10000 40 
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The transport pathway considered in these analyses is shallow groundwater. 
The volumetric flow rate is 315.58 m®/yr. 
Two types of disruptive event scenario were evaluated in this study. These 
events included earthquakes with an annual rate of occurrence of 1x10'^  and 
flooding the repository with an annual rate of occurrence of 1x10"®. When either of 
these events occurs, the event consequences are: 
1. Number of waste packages moved to the AE is zero. 
2. Number of waste packages disrupted is ninety (approximately 10% of the 
total number of containers). 
3. Number of waste packages moved to the transport pathway is one 
(approximately 1% of number of waste packages disrupted). 
4. Movement of the contents of waste packages from one pathway to another 
is zero, since only one pathway is considered. 
Another assumption made in addition to those described in chapter 5 is that 
for the first 1000 years after initial emplacement, none of the waste packages fails. 
The other limitation of this preliminary study is that the exclusion zone that was 
employed includes not only the land portion on the east-west sides (or the width of 
the island), but also the seawater surrounding the island. Therefore, the transport 
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pathway length of the groundwater (1000 m) may not necessarily reflect the true 
length of the groundwater pathway. 
Using the assumptions above, the calculation of the total releases of 
radionuclides to the AE by the RIP computer code may not represent the most 
accurate analyses, since significant dilution will occur once the radionuclides reach 
the seawater. Therefore, the results of these calculations may be an overestimate. 
This, in turn, suggests that calculations for the AEDE, CEDE and CCEDE would be 
significantly less than those presented in this preliminary study. 
